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ABSTRACT
The various approaches which are currently used to allocate state
transit operating assistance are reviewed to determine which has the
greatest potential to administer funds efficiently and effectively and
meet other transit goals. The review suggests that the performance-
based approach to allocating state transit operating assistance has the
greatest potential.
An investigation of the performance-based programs which have been
developed for various states shows a varie-ty of forms which a performance-
based allocation progran may assume. Each form has its own strengths and
weaknesses, which reflect different options selected to deal with the
problems of evaluating performance.
An empirical analysis *of one of the programs is conducted to in-
vestigate the potential of such a program to improve performance. Both
a time-series and a peer group analysis are conducted. Both analyses
show that the performance of the operators improved on some of the speci-
fied measures and thus suggest that the program has led to improved per-
formance.
These results suggest that the performance-based approach to allo-
cating state transit operating assistance should be seriously considered.
The results of the program may be even greater, once some of the problems
involved in developing and implementing such a program are resolved. Some
Suggestions are made concerning resolution of these problems, and a general
framework for development of a performance-based allocation program is
suggested.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel H. M. Wilson
Title: Professor of Civil Engineering
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Scope of Thesis
The recent demands for accountability of government expenditures
have led to increased concern about the efficiency and effectiveness of
many government programs. In transitthis concern raises questions about
how assistance should be allocated in order to assure efficient and
effective service provision. Public officials at all levels of govern-
ment are reviewing alternative approaches to allocating operating
assistance to determine if their current procedures can be improved.
Some have asserted that the performance-based approach is the most
appropriate.
This research examines alternative procedures for allocating
state transit operating assistance to determine if the performance-based
approach has the potential to promote more efficient provision of transit
service as well as meeting other criteria of importance to a transit
assistance program. Although several states have developed performance-
based operating assistance allocation procedures, the effectiveness of
such a program in improving system performance has not been assessed to
date. This research investigates the potential of such an approach.
1.2 Motivation and Objectives of Research
The increasing cost of providing transit service together with
declining ridership has led to increased fares and decreased service.
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The result of these interrelated factors has been a widening of the
gap between farebox revenues and system expenses, which places an
extra and rapidly rising burden on the various levels of government
which provide operating assistance to public transit agencies. Many
states which have been increasing sources of transit operating assistance
since the mid-1970's, are being pressed to increase their assistance to
transit even more.
As the fiscal burdens associated with transit continue to grow,
the allocation of limited state resources among the eligible operators
is becoming a more critical issue for all state transit assistance
programs. Transit policy makers are faced with the problem of the
deteriorating financial condition of the public transport industry
at a time when all government spending is being questioned and
controlled. In addition to overall belt-tightening, the existence
of federal operating subsidies is threatened. The reduction and the
possible elimination of all federal operating assistance, if carried
out, will place considerable additional pressure on state sources,
as well as the farebox and local sources, if essential public transit
services are to be maintained. Despite the difficult financial
condition of many states, transit proponents will be looking for the
states to expand their roles in providing operating assistance.
Obtaining increased operating assistance from the states will be
difficult, however, because of the overall worsening conditions of
state budgets. Along with any increase or even continuance of state
assistance to public transit operations, there is increasing concern
that this assistance is used economically and that it is producing
-11-
results which are effective in improving transit service. In response
to these concerns, many states are reviewing their procedures for
allocating operating assistance to determine if better results can be
obtained through changes. Since the performance-based approach appears
to have the greatest potential and is receiving a lot of attention, it
is important to determine whether this type of approach is likely to
improve performance .
The objectives of this research are:
(1) To determine if a performance-based approach can lead to more
efficient and effective use of transit assistance than other
approaches.
(2) To examine the various types of performance-based allocation
programs that have been developed at the state level.
(3) To critically review the use of performance evaluation in the
transit industry to determine how it can best be applied in a
state-level operating assistance allocation program.
(4) To assess the ability of such an approach to improve performance.
(5) To develop a general framework for states to use in designing a
performance-based operating assistance allocation program and to
gain some insight into the issues involved and some of the
problems which may be encountered in the development of a
performance-based allocation program.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
Chapter 2 examines the various approaches which have been used
to allocate operating assistance and evaluates them according to their
-12-
ability to promote efficient and effective provision of transit
service and other important criteria.
Various types of performance-based operating assistance alloca-
tion programs which have been developed for five different states are
described in Chapter 3.
A case study of the program in Pennsylvania is conducted in
Chapter 4 to assess the potential of such programs in improving
"performance" and in assuring efficient and effective service provision.
The effects of the program on operations within the state are analyzed
using both a time series and a comparison peer group analysis.
Since the success of a performance-based program in improving
"performance" is dependent upon th-e quality of the evaluation, Chapter
5 is devoted to a critical review of the use of performance evaluation
in the transit industry and how it can be applied to a state-level
operating assistance allocation program. The potential problems of
implementing such programs are illustrated by a discussion of the
programs which were described in Chapter 3 and the case study of the
Pennsylvania program.
Based on the results of the analysis of Pennsylvania's program,
the experiences in other states, and the critique of performance
evaluation, a general framework for developing a state-level perfor-
mance-based operating assistance allocation-program is proposed.
Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions which can be drawn from
this research about allocating operating assistance on the basis of
performance and the potential implementation problems. Suggestions
for future research in the area are also included.
-13-
CHAPTER 2
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ALLOCATING STATE TRANSIT OPERATING
ASSISTANCE*
2.1 Introduction
A wide variety of procedures for allocating transit operating
assistance are currently being utilized by the twenty-six states which
offer such assistance. The use of many different approaches may be
explained by the following factors:
1. Most of the operating assistance programs were built out
of crisis situations and were formulated to preserve
existing services which-were threatened, or to stabilize
fares in the face of rapidly rising costs and declining
ridership. While the method of distribution was of some
concern, many subsidy programs were not particularly
sophisticated. l)
2. State operating assistance for transit is relatively new
and many programs are still in the experimental stages. The
earliest state programs for operating assistance were not
developed until the late 1960s and early 1970s. The varying
characteristics of operations across the states, (and even
* This chapter includes some of the criteria and conclusions drawn
from a paper by James Miller entitled, "An Evaluation of Allocation
Methodologies for Public Transit Operating Assistance" (1979).
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within states) state traditions and political
configurations, and economic circumstances make it
difficult to develop a program which satisfies all
concerns. Therefore, an "ideal" program has not been
developed and each state attempts to develop an approach
which best meets its objectives.
3. The objectives of operating assistance programs vary
across states. This is related to the different goals
and objectives each state has for transit and the
different characteristics of the urban areas in each
state.
This chapter critically revi'ews the different categories of operating
assistance allocation. The critique is based on the assumption that
state operating assistance is provided to supplement a transit agency's
revenues so that the provision of at least a minimum level of transit
service may be maintained. It is also assumed that the state supports
transit because it meets fundamental societal goals such as providing
mobility, reducing congestion, etc. Therefore, the procedure used to
allocate transit operating assistance should not inhibit the ability of
a transit system to meet societal goals.
The criteria used to evaluate alternative approaches to allocating
operating assistance can best be described by the following series of
questions:
(1) Does the allocation procedure promote efficient use of transit
resources? Does the procedure reward efficient operations or
penalize inefficient ones?
-15-
(2) Does the allocation procedure provide for accountability? i.e.,
does the procedure require that agencies demonstrate the
results attained with the assistance?
(3) Does the allocation procedure support attainment of the funda-
mental social objectives of providing transit service? Is it
consistent with the State's goals? Local goals?
(4) Does the allocation procedure provide incentives to improve
performance? or are the incentives distortive in that they
cause operators to act in ways which are detrimental to the
service?
(5) Does the procedure include consideration of the agencies' needs?
(i.e., it doesn't overfundisome systems and underfund others).
(6) Is the data attainable? Is the required data available at a
reasonable cost? Is the available data reliable?
(7) Does the procedure allow fund determination to be made in a
timely fashion? What is the lag time between qualifying (e.g.
submitting the required statistics) and receiving the grant?
(8) Does the procedure insure consistency of fund determination both
between systems and between years? Is it subject to political
manipulation?
(9) Is it possible for transit agencies to predict their share in
order to facilitate their planning and budgeting?
(10) Is the allocation procedure equitable?
The various operating assistance allocation procedures fall into
one or more of the following categories:
-16-
1. Return to Source
2. Need or Deficit Based
3. Matching (to Section 5 or Local Share)
4. Service Related Formulas
5. Usage Based
6. Performance Based
7. Discretionary
8. Area Characteristics Based
9. Targeted at Specific Population Groups.
Each of the nine categories is described and evaluated below.
2.2 Return to Source
The return to source method of allocating state transit
operating assistance involves the return of the income from taxes
collected by the state in urban areas to these areas for transit. The
idea behind this method is to fund systems in an equitable manner,
based on the region's contribution of revenue. Two states which use
this method are California and Illinois. California returns 1/4% of
the state sales tax money to the county in which it was generated.
The Illinois program establishes two special funds: one is the Bi-
State Public Transportation Fund and the other is the Downstate
Transportation Fund.( 2) The Bi-State Public Transportation Fund was
established to cover the operating deficits of the Bi-State Develop-
ment Agency. This fund receives 2/32 of the state sales tax
collected in the three counties served by the Bi-State Development
-17-
Agency if a local match is provided. If no local match is provided,
the fund can receive 1/32 of the state sales tax collections from within
the three county areas.
This type of program has several advantages:
1. It is easy to administer and is free of political manipulation,
2. therefore the procedure is consistent from year to year.
3. It distributes assistance according to a region's contribution
to revenues.
4. It provides a somewhat predictable level of funding to the
operations.
5. There are no demanding data needs, and
It allows allocation decisions to be made in a timely fashion.
However, this allocation procedure also has many drawbacks
associated with it. Perhaps the major disadvantage of a procedure which
bases the amount of funding a system receives on the amount of sales
tax generated in the area is that it provides no link between the
amount of assistance awarded and the needs of the transit operation. In
fact, this method is most likely to overfund systems in high income
areas and underfund the large, old systems in low income urban areas.
This method is clearly contrary to the social objective of transit
service to provide accessibility and mobility to those who are dis-
advantaged. This allocation method does not provide incentives to
the transit operator to accomplish state objectives since the amount of
assistance received is independent of the service provided and the
state's objectives for this service. In some areas, where systems are
-18-
overfunded by this allocation, resources may be inefficiently
utilized.
The problem of inefficiency may be compounded by the fact that
this method does not require the transit operators to be accountable for
the use of state funds, nor does it tie these funds to particular
objectives. This method is desirable for those who feel that transit
should be run according to local objectives and that the state should
merely serve as a funding pass-through agency.
2.3 Need or Deficit Based
One of the oldest and most popular allocation methodologies is
need or deficit based. This type of program is intended to relate
the amount of funding awarded to the degree of financial need (as
measured by the operating deficit). States which employ this methodo-
logy inherently assume that the currently provided service is desirable
or at least should be maintained. The allocation usually involves state
reimbursement for a fixed portion of the deficit (excluding the federal
contribution) or expenses or may involve a purely discretionary assess-
ment of need.
The intent of such need-based programs is to increase the total
local budget and thereby allow more service to be provided at the same
local cost.(3) However, as Forkenbrock and Dueker point out, while
this outcome is possible there are incentives inherent in this procedure
that foster inefficiency. (4) Since the operating deficit is at least
partly funded by the state, there is a lack of incentive to control the
deficit because state funds will increase as it increases. The increase
-19-
in state assistance reduces the locally borne cost of another unit
of input. This effective price reduction may promote the expenditure
of more money on inputs (e.g. higher wages and salaries or less
operating efficiency) or lower fares without proportionally increasing
the amount or quality of service provided. The problem is compounded
by a lack of accountability for expenditures. This problem may be
circumvented by constraining the amount of costs or deficit eligible
for funding, or by setting an upper bound on the amount of assistance
a system may receive.
Many states have, in effect, placed such constraints on funding
due to the limited amount of state funds available relative to the needs
of the transit agencies. Some states have responded with an across the
board reduction in the percentage of the deficit they will cover.
Other states have constrained the increase in eligible deficit with
inflation factors. Still others have instituted a discretionary program
to eliminate items or projects from the budget which are not approved.
However, these efforts do not preclude the possibility that a
more efficient property may receive less assistance. Allocation
programs based on expenses or deficits may provide incentives to reduce
operating efficiency. For example, an operator may be more generous
when negotiating wages with the labor unions if he feels that all or a
major portion, of the increased expense will be recovered from state
assistance or some combination of federal, state, and local assistance.
The need to prevent this type of reaction may be fulfilled by determining
the amount of eligible deficit as the non-federal deficit and limiting the
state's contribution to an equal match with the local share.
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This type of program is attractive because it is very simple
to administer. The only data required are system revenues and expenses,
which are needed for budgetary purposes anyway. Grants can be awarded
prior to actual expenditures on the basis of the operator's budget for
the coming year, with adjustments being made at the end of the year,
or the agency may be reimbursed for expenses at the end of the fiscal
year. If the portion of expenses (or deficit ) which will be covered
by the state is known a priori, the operator can predict the amount of
assistance the agency will receive based on the budget. However, if
the amount of assistance is determined by a discretionary assessment of
need, the operator may not be able to predict the amount his/her agency
will receive. In this case, the procedure is subject to political
manipulation; the grant determination process may not be consistent
from year to year if state officials change.
2.4 Matching
Many state operating assistance programs which were developed after
Section 5 are need-related, based on reimbursement of a percentage of the
non-federal deficit. These programs recognize the effect the federal
subsidy has in reducing the realized deficit and therefore adjust their
contribution to cover a portion of this realized deficit. This method
may establish some sense of efficiency and accountability since the
locality will have to pay a fixed portion of the cost of providing
transit service.
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A more restrictive method, which inherently provides accountability,
is one which allocates funds directly proportional with local revenues.
In other words, for each non-federal dollar the operation can raise, the
state will pledge one dollar to help cover the deficit. Nebraska
utilizes such a procedure; the state provides an equal match with the
locality up to 50% of the eligible operating costs.
This method ensures a local commitment to transit. However,
allocating funds this way may be harmful to poorer areas where transit
service is desired, but local finances are not sufficient to provide
the service.
The state of Montana allocates all subsidies (capital and
operating) according to the community's local transit support. Rather than
a strict match, however, the funding is allocated according to the percent-
age of each community's local-transit support of total statewide transit
support. The amount of assistance allocated to each community may be
represented by the fol.lowing:
x.
S. =S
where: Xi is the amount of support in community i Cs); scall communities
in the state
S is the total state subsidy
Si is the subsidy to community i
This procedure may evoke competition between communities to increase
their local contributions in order to obtain a greater amount of state
aid. Conversely, communities may collude and determine to contribute
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a minimal amount, forcing the state to increase its share as the deficit
increases.
This procedure has the advantages of (1) simple administration
(facilitates timely grants and a consistent procedure); (2) distribution
of assistance according to each region's willingness to pay for transit,
(3) there are no difficult data requirements, (4) it allows local
objectives to be pursued and (5) it enables agencies to make reasonable
predictions of the size of their awards. The major disadvantages are
that the amount of assistance received is not related to the service
and that poorer areas,who cannot contribute much, will be awarded
less money. Also, this method does not inherently promote state
objectives nor does it reward good performance.
2.5 Service-Related Formula
Some states allocate operating assistance according to a measure
of produced service (e.g. vehicle miles or vehicle hous). Generally,
the state reimburses each operator a specified amount per unit of
service produced or funds are allocated according to each regions
proportion of the total amount of service provided in the state. The
intent of a service related allocation formula is to allocate assistance
in an equitable manner. However, the result is that the same amount of
assistance per unit of service is provided to all operators, independent
of the cost of providing the service or the need of the agency. There-
fore, in some cases a system may be overfunded and not concerned about
efficiency.
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The problems encountered in this method are related to the
measures used to define service. The measures most often used (revenue
vehicle miles and revenue vehicle hours) measure only the amount of
output produced and pay no attention to the need for or use of that
service or the differences in operating environments. Allocations
based on revenue vehicle miles are biased against low speed,
congested urban areas where routes and trip lengths are relatively
short, but the number of passengers carried is high. Some states
use revenue vehicle hours instead, in an attempt to eliminate this
bias. This measure, however, is biased against high speed routes and
neither measures service value (since passengers do not buy blocks
of vehicle time), nor provides incentives to eliminate ineffective or in-
efficient services. A bus which drives around empty for four hours
deserves subsidization less than one which runs for only one hour
and carries passengers.
The benefits of service-related allocation methodologies
are that they are linked to some measure of the system's service
and thus provide some accountability for expenditures, they are
relatively easy to administer and facilitate consistency from
year to year, the data necessary is not too difficult to obtain,
(although its reliability may be questioned), and they provide
a relatively stable and predictable funding source.
2.6 Usage Based
Most usage based allocation. methods distribute assistance
according to the number of passengers carried or passenger miles.
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This attempts to reward effective systems, since ridership is one
measure of effectiveness. The problem with this method is that it
does not consider factors which are external to the operator that
influence ridership nor does it pay attention to the increment of
mobility provided by the system. This allocation methodology may result
in decreasing the amount of assistance distributed to those systems
which need it the most (perhaps people do not want to ride the system
because the service is atrocious, but the operator cannot improve
the service without increasing his budget). Systems in declining
areas may not be adequately funded by this methodology, since many
of them have stable or decreasing ridership (5), but the service
may be essential in those areas for the transportation disadvantaged.
Allocation based on the number of passengers carried does not
promote any specific objectives except ridership maximization. A
record of the number of passengers says nothing about the character-
istics of these passengers (e.g. age, income, car ownership), the
cost of carrying these passengers, or the quality of service provided.
Even if the state's goal is to maximize ridership, it is questionable
how well this method will facilitate and reward attainment of this goal
since accurate statistics on ridership are difficult to obtain.
Some systems use passenger miles as the measure of use.
This measure is much more difficult to obtain and has many of the
problems mentioned above. However, it may be correlated with the
objective of drawing people out of automobiles. When the increase
in passenger miles is achieved by improvements in service which
make transit more desirable than the automobile (e.g. a reduction in
the travel time to work).
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Allocations which are based on use do have the advantage of
relating the amount of money awarded to some measure of effectiveness.
They are relatively easy to administer, given the data is available
and reliable, and grants can be awarded based on the previous year's
statistics or a prediction of the upcoming year. Given the same
statistic is used to allocate assistance from year to year, the
program can be administered in a consistent manner from year to year.
If the operator has a good idea of his/her ridership levels, he/she
can predict the amount of assistance the agency will receive. Care
must be taken, however, when using these measures as a basis for
allocating funds between various systems with different operating and
operating environment characteristics.
2.7 Performance Based
Performance based subsidy allocation generally relates a
system's level of performance, as defined by some predetermined
indicator(s), to the amount of assistance provided. The intent behind
such allocation programs is to promote the state's objectives (as
defined by the indicators) by financially rewarding agencies which
perform in accordance with these objectives. Some programs include
penalties for systems which stray from these objectives. Peformance-
based allocation procedures require explicit definition of the
state's goals and objectives for transit and development of indicators
which accurately reflect attainment of these objectives. These are
two very difficult tasks, which will be discussed in later chapters.
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Once the appropriate performance indicators have been selected, the
state must define how these measures will be used to distribute funds.
Three analysis methods can be used to determine each system's
allocation in performance-based funding: (1) minimum standards,
(2) cross-sectional analysis, and (3) time series analysis. Each of
these allocation mechanisms creates the incentive to maximize (or at
least to attain an acceptable level of) the performance measures, since
systems that perform better on these measures receive more funds.
Programs based on attainment of a minimum level of service
as defined by predetermined performance standards tend to be somewhat
arbitrary, overly rigid, and ignore important differences between systems.
This allocation mechanism may present an all-or-nothing allocation of
funding, i.e. if the agency achieves the minimum standard it receives
assistance, but if the agency does not achieve the minimum standard it
does not receive funding. However, the all-or-nothing allocation is
seldom used since it is infeasible to deny an agency all support based
on somewhat arbitrary standards. Therefore, most states use a portion
of the subsidy or bonus funds as the reward for good performance.
The most common use of this application of performance-based funding
occurs with service contracting. In this case, the contract states
the service level which must be provided in order to receive state
funds.
Comparisons of performance evaluations have been used to define
acceptable levels of service. However, a cross-sectional analysis of
the performance of various systems ignores differences in system
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characteristics and in operating environment characteristics which
can affect performance. Studies have been conducted which attempt
to control for these differences by defining peer groups -- systems
with similar characteristics and similar operating environments. Such
peer group analyses have potential if all relevant characteristics
are the same.
In order to avoid the problem of comparing unlike systems,
allocation decisions may be based on time series analyses which
compare the performance of each system to its performance in prior
years. If performance has improved, the system is rewarded with a
greater amount of assistance. By focusing on the change in performance
for each system, the problemsof comparing unlike systems are eliminated,
and each agency is provided with an incentive to improve its performance.
Performance-based allocation mechanisms may provide an adequate
funding mechanism, unless the all-or-nothing criterion or penalties for
unacceptable performance are used. Performance-based allocation can
provide a means for ensuring that the state's goals and objectives for
transit are pursued. Measures of equity, efficiency and effectiveness
may be built into the allocation methodology so that future improve-
ments are encouraged through the funding mechanism. Peformance-based
funding may allow the operator to predict the funding his agency will
receive by examining its performance statistics. Depending on the
performance indicators selected for evaluation, the program may be
relatively easy to administer once the indicators are defined and the
allocation criterion are determined.
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Some states (e.g. California and New York) require each
agency to conduct periodic performance evaluations according to state
guidelines in order to be eligible for state funds. These performance
reports are not associated with any bonuses or penalties, however,
it is possible that performance will improve simply due to the fact
that it is being monitored. Performance based allocation methodologies
possess the inherent benefit of providing accountability. Assuming
improvement occurs or an acceptable level of performance is maintained,
agencies will demonstrate efficient use of limited resources. This
demonstration is essential to winning legislative support.
2.8 Discretionary
Transit assistance allocation decisions may be determined on a
discretionary basis by the legislature or the Department of Transport-
ation. Many discretionary programs are purportedly based on need.
As the number of transit agencies requiring assistance has grown,
the costs of such a centrally administered program have led many
states to move away from discretionary procedures to programs which are
much simpler to administer. Although it is claimed that discretionary
programs provide states with the opportunity to pursue their
objectives and exercise leadership,(6) these programs may have high
monitary costs for agency staff, data collection, and general
administration if decisions are based on -a broad range of information
about each of the agencies; are suseptible to political influence ;and
do not provide predictable funding to individual agencies .
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Since a discretionary approach is so flexible, it may be used
to promote efficient use of transit resources, to support the attainment of
social objectives, to provide incentives to improve performance, to reinfor-
ce specific state or local objectives, or to fund agencies relative to
need. The discretionary allocation method is only effective in promoting
state objectives if these objectives are clearly stated and the
operators understand the objectives and what they should do to attain
them (and consequently receive more money). Therefore, the state
must communicate not only its objectives, but also the method it
will use to evaluate individual systems. If the objectives and
evaluation methods are not clearly stated, the allocation procedure is
susceptible to political manipulation, does not provide clear lines
of cohtrol or accountability, and does not provide incentives to
agencies to strive for the state's objectives. These problems were identi-
fied by Fielding and Lyons, for the Minnesotta exurban subsidy
program, which gives MnDOT final authority to grant financial assistance
(not to exceed 2/3 of the operating deficit).(8)
The Minnisota program requires that agencies apply annually for
grants; MnDOT has the responsibility to establish the procedures and
standards for review and approval of applications, and for evaluating
and monitoring performance(9). However, MnDOT ran into administrative
problems because they never explicitly stated their objectives nor estab-
lished links with grant recipients which passed clear lines of control
and accountability.
The selection, monitoring, and overall evaluation of projects were
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weak, as a result. (10) The program required a large staff, expensive
and difficult to obtain data, a lack of performance incentives, and
resulted in hard to justify decisions .
Lyons (33) suggests a revised structure for a discretionary
grant program which begins with explicit policy directions and goals from
the legislature. He recommends that the agency (DOT) should follow these
policies and develop specific objectives (derived from legislative goals
and quantified, when possible) and procedures to administer the program.
The agency should establish guidelines in order to inform operators
of program objectives. The operators will conform to these agency
objectives in order to get funding. This program structure is best
suited for performance-based allocation. Lyons suggests a management
by objectives process between the agency and its applicants, with
performance targets which are negotiated and quantified to the
greatest extent possible; these same measures should be used to
evaluate the agencies.
The discretionary allocation procedure may also include
incentives such as bonuses or contract renewal for satisfying targets.
(This makes the program more like performance-based programs). A
local match may be required to encourage local control over spending.
The discretionary method allows state administrators maximum flexibi-
lity in disbursing funds and therefore provides the potential to
reward good performance and to support innovation and the development
of positive programs. (12)
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2.9 Urban Characteristics
Allocation procedures which are based on urban characteristics,
like return to source procedures, differ from most other procedures
in that funds are allocated according to the characteristics of the
area in which the system operates as opposed to being allocated, on
the basis of system characteristics. Most procedures based on urban
characteristics utilize measures of the population and/or population
density of the service area (usually within a 1/4 mile radius from the
stops ) to define the method of distributing funds. The state funds
are allocated based on the area's proportion of the state's total
service area population. One problem with this type of allocation is
that it is costly and time consuming to collect data concerning
"service area population". This is due to the fact that system
boundaries, especially service area boundaries are generally not consis-
tent with census areas. Therefore, the definition of "service area
population" is often modified to correspond to a census area for
which data is readily available. However, this statistic does not
truly represent the service area population.
Population and population density based allocation procedures
do not possess mechanisms to assure efficiency or attainment specific
state objectives. As the distribution of funds is independent of the
system itself, the operator receives the funds with no strings
attached. This allows the operator to determine his/her own object-
ives. This method possesses the disadvantages of funding systems based
on factors outside the control of the operator, without consideration
of need and without considerations of the service offered.
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The allocation of operating assistance based on population
is efficient only if transit demand is uniformly distributed and if
there are no economies of scale in providing service. The assumption
of uniformly distributed demand is the more troublesome of these two
conditions - the level of transit service, and the demand for that
(13)
service, is not equal everywhere . Even if uniform service
is provided, preferences for transit vary and therefore the demand
for transit is not likely to be uniform.
An argument can also be made that, assuming one goal of transit
service is to provide mobility to the transportation disadvantaged, the trans-
portation disadvantaged who benefit least live in lower density areas where the
cost/passenger trip is subsequently higher and other transportation
alternatives are limited .
Methods based on formulas which employ population or population
density offer little flexibility and little opportunity to respond
to individual system needs, local preferences, or social goals. This
type of program provides no incentive for system efficiency or overall
"good performance". Methodologies based on population or population
density are consistent with the philosophy that equal funding should be
given to similar areas, i.e. similar communities should be afforded
the same opportunity to provide transit service. This desire to provide
equal opportunity for transit will only be fulfilled if:
a) the demand for transit is uniform, (b) the costs of providing
service are similar, and (c) all systems are operated with similar
efficiency. (15)
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The main benefits of an urban-characteristics-based subsidy
allocation methodology are : (1) it is easy to administer once the
service area population is determined; (2) it provides a predictable
funding source for the operators; (3) it ensures consistency
in the allocation procedure from year to year; and (4) it allows
grant determination to be accomplished in a timely fashion. States which
utilize urban area characteristics in their operating subsidy allocation
methodologies also generally include some measure of service (e.g. the state
of Michigan, which allocates funds 50% on the percentage share of
population and 50% on the percentage share of eligible vehicle miles)
or use the characteristics to identify categories of systems within
which to define sub-allocation methodologies. An example of the
latter technique was developed by Forkenbrock for the state of Iowa (9 ).
A modification of this method was implemented in Iowa and is discussed
later in the thesis. Forkenbrock suggests that transit systems be
categorized according to area characteristics. He then suggests that
the total amount of state funds should be allocated to each category
of systems according to its proportion of the previous year's net
deficit. First,25% of the available funds are set aside in a
discretionary account. The remaining funds are allocated within
categories according to a weighted sum of ridership and vehicle miles.
The weights for each variable may vary between categories. The
allocation procedure can be represented as follows:
Step I: Allocation to System Categories
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where: S. = amount of subsidy allocated to category j
D. = the net deficit for category j
D. = the net deficit of system i
Step II: Intra-Category Allocation
R. M.
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where: S. = amount of subsidy allocated to system i
R (W RnWR, W = weights assigned to ridership (Wj)and vehicle
miles (W ) for category j
R. = ridership of system i
M. = vehicle miles of system i
The allocation methodology developed by Forkenbrock combines
discretion, service area characteristics, and peformance,defined as
net deficit, ridership and revenue vehicle miles) as bases for
allocating assistance. The advantages cited by Forkenbrock and Dueker
(19) include:
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1) The temptation for systems to increase their net deficits
in order to obtain more funds is lessened (as opposed to
pure deficit-based allocations) because increasing one's
net deficit will only result in a portion of the increase
in funds that would be available on a purely deficit based
allocation. This is because increasing the deficit
increases the total deficit by the same amount, but only a
portion of this increase is allocated back to the category
in which this system falls. Only part of the increased
share would then be allocated to the particular system.
2) The 25% of the subsidy reserved for discretionary allocation
can be used to reward systems which perform well and there:
fore provide an incentive to system operators to achieve the
state's objectives.
3) Separating systems into categories allows different types of
systems to be treated differently. This is especially true
since the weights on the ridership and the revenue vehicle
miles may vary between categories to account for differences
in the local operating environment.
However, application of this procedure is limited in states
with a small number of large metropolitan areas. In this situation most
of the funds would end up with relatively few of the largest operators
in the large metro. areas, since this category is likely to have
the largest deficit. If this situation occurs, it will be useful for one
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of these operators to increase his deficit to get more funds.
2.10 Targeted at Specific Polulation
Some states have, as one of their objectives for transit, the goal of
providing mobility for such transportation disadvantaged groups as the
poor, elderly, and handicapped. To promote accessibility for these
groups, the state may provide assistance to the operator in return for
reduced fares or special service for these groups. An example of
this type of program is presented in PA's program for senior
citizens. The state of PA conducts a state lottery, the proceeds
of which are used to subsidize a free-fare program for senior citizens.
Delaware also operates a program for transportation disadvanta-
ged groups. The program, Senior Citizen Affordable Taxi, provides
50% subsidy to elderly and handicapped who can use regular taxi
service.
Assistance which is targeted at specific groups is successful
in reducing the cost of transit service to this group, given they can
access the service. However, this method does not ensure that
service is available to these groups. The Delaware program has a
better chance of meeting the needs of these groups since it
subsidizes a demand-responsive flexible-route service. However,
even with a 50 percent subsidy, the cost of taxi service may make
it prohibitive.
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2.11 The Potential of Performance-Based Allocations
Performance-based allocations methodologies seem to be the
most congruent with the current concerns for accountability of
public expenditures and for ensuring that transit service is provided
efficiently and effectively.
Performance-based allocation of transit assistance
provides increased accountability to the public concer-
-ning the use of public funds when compared to other allocation
methodologies which grant assistance to agencies based on non-system
related or deficit based programs. This increased accountability for
transit expenditures may develop a better understanding of the problems
encountered in trying to provide transit service, and may lead to an
increased probability of maintaining the current level of (or possibly
even increasing) assistance. This is especially important at this
time, when Congress has reduced federal transit assistance from $ 4.7B
in 1981 to approximately $ 3.5B for 1982. Since states are one of the
sources pressed to increase their support to transit, a question
arises concerning the extent to which they should be expected to pay
for transit service that is administered largely out of their control.
Performance measures may be able to show the public the return from
their support.
Not only do performance based allocations programs provide
public accountability for the use of transit subsidies, they also
provide an incentive to transit operators to take action to improve
the performance of their operations. When operators see that they can
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increase their share of state funds by improving performance, they
(hopefully) will critically assess their current operations to see if
and where improvements can be made. In this respect, performance-
based subsidy allocation programs may direct operators to longer
run planning, policies, and issues than the current focus on day-to-
day operations. The operator may find that some parts of his
operations are, in fact, inefficiently run.
Identification of inefficiencies in the operation will lead
the operator to correct these problems. The operator may seek new
techniques to solve these problems. The state can facilitate the
operator's search for problem-solving techniques by providing manuals,
technical assistance, and/or seminars presenting new ideas. The
increased awareness of inefficiencies and techniques to eliminate
them may lead to innovative solution approaches. It is even possible
that, in the long run, the cost of providing the same level of transit
service will be reduced, and, consequently, the need for operating
assistance will also be reduced.
The provision of operating assistance to transit operations is
conditioned by the following four facts of political life(16)
"(1) Most taxpayers believe that government programs are
wasteful. As inflation and recession cause them to
experience increased personal financial stress, citizens
are more inclined to demand that their taxes be lowered,
that government productivity be improved, and that waste
in government be eliminated.
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(2) Few citizens and public employees are willing to
voluntarily surrender government services and benefits they
have come to expect ano depend on.
(3) Public officials are forced to make changes within a structure
of laws, rules, procedures, and regulations (e.g. merit
systems, line budget items, and special boards, commi-
ssions, and authorities) that limit alternatives, rigidify
decision making, and fragment authority. For the most
part, these constraints were installed during periods of
growth to control budget expansions and are limited
tools for managing budget contractions.
(4) Fine-tuning the finances and administration of public
agencies and programs will not alone solve the larger
problems of stimulating economic growth, but it may
contribute - along with other government policies and
private sector initiatives - to restoring the economic
growth rates of the 50's and 60's."
Performance-based subsidy allocation can work within these
conditions. This type of subsidy program directly addresses the
first point by rewarding transit agencies that "perform well"
and thereby eliminates waste. The second point may be addressed if
performance-based allocation programs are effective, (e.g. if performa-
nce-based allocation leads operators to improve the efficiency of
their operations, the need for subsidization may be reduced and may
prevent service cutbacks). Performance based allocation programs can
be designed to fit within, yet not be disrupted by the political
constraints. At a time when the actual continuance of operating
subsidies is being questioned, an excellent opportunity arises for major
program changes to occur. As C Kenneth Orski stated (17)
"These are difficult times because urban transit systems are
struggling with record operating deficits as federal transit
subsidies are being phased out and cities are confronting a
severe fiscal freeze. They are the best of times because these
very pressures are creating unprecedented opportunities for
-40-
institutional and service innovations that promise to
lift transit out of its current predicament and restore
its fiscal soundness".
Even if major changes cannot occur in the allocations
procedure, the performance-based allocation procedure may be
utilized in addition to or as part of an existing program to
provide incentives for bonus funding.
The fourth condition stated above may include transit
operating assistance, but must consider other state programs and
policies to determine its applicability.
The allocation of operating subsidies based on performance
provides a mechanism for the state to pursue its. goals and objectives
for transit and to lead operators toward their achievement. Not
only must the state identify goals and objectives, but it must also
provide the criteria (performance measures) it will use to evaluate
the various operations' achievement of these goals and objectives.
The identification of actual measures which will be used to allocate
funds also removes some of the political pressures placed on subsidy
allocation programs which may result in unfair distribution of funds.
Performance-based allocation programs may also lead to increa-
sing the operators' capacity to predict funding. The operator will be
able to look at his performance to determine the amount of funding
relative to the previous year's performance and subsidy allocation.
The procedure also provides the operator with some degree of control
(to the extent that he can control the operation and influence it's
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performance) over how much money he will receive.
Performance-based subsidy allocation may not only supply the
mechanism necessary to provide accountability for transit subsidy
expenditures, but also provides incentives to improve the performance
of transit operations and therefore may lead to more efficient and
effective operations in the long run.
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CHAPTER 3
PERFORMANCE-BASED STATE OPERATING ASSISTANCE ALLOCATION PROGRAMS
The merits of a performance-based approach to allocating operating
assistance and the increasing interest in performance-based operating
assistance allocation at the state level dictates that the potential of
such programs be examined. The potential benefits which may accrue to
both the operator and the state from a well-designed performance-based
operating subsidy allocation program have enticed several states to
investigate the use of this type of approach. This chapter reviews the
state programs which have been developed to date. A case study of
one of the programs is presented in-Chapter 4, and an evaluation of the
various programs and a general framework for application is developed
in Chapter 5.
The differences between the programs which have been developed
are indicative of the difficulties encountered in creating a performance-
based procedure to allocate assistance.
One of the most crucial decisions to be made is which performance
indicator(s) to use and, if more than one is to be used, how many.
Although it is commonly recognized that the performance measures
selected should reflect the state's goals, these goals are usually
ambiguous. Even when the goals are stated clearly, they are often
difficult to make operational. For example, how does one measure
the effectiveness of transit service? Many measures have been
suggested, but no one, best measure has been identified. The selection
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of an indicator involves tradeoffs between validity (as a measure of
attainment of the objective) and data collection costs.
Another difficult decision faced when developing a statewide
performance evaluation is the selection of criteria or standards against
which the agencies' statistics may be assessed. In some cases,
the evaluator sets minimum standards for the performance indicators
before the evaluation period (e.g. if the performance is evaluated
annually, the standards are determined prior to the year which is being
evaluated). The standards may be developed from a number of sources --
guidelines from similar properties, nationwide averages, professional
judgement, or the individual agencies' past performance. The major
weakness of predetermined standards is their inability to account for
unexpected events (e.g., a sudden reduction in transit use caused by a
reduction in fuel prices or, conversely, a sudden increase in transit
use caused by an energy crisis).
Standards may also be determined post facto. Often a standard
is determined by the average statistic of agencies nationwide or
statewide, or from a sample of these operators. However, due to the
complications encountered when comparing agencies which have different
operating characteristics and different operating environments, a
"peer group" of similar agencies may be used to determine the standards.
Even though the use of the performance of similar properties as input
into the determination of standards can control for environmental
influences to a degree, it can not provide a control for factors which
affect individual agencies, e.g. a strike. This type of factor must
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be considered when conducting the evaluation; the standard must be
adjusted to reflect the effects.
A third way to determine standards is to combine the pre-
determined standard and the comparison with the statistics of other
agencies during the same period. The use of this approach allows
the evaluator to determine standards which he feels the agencies should
attain, but also allows him to temper these standards with the actual
performance of other agencies for the period. The statistics of the
other agencies may suggest that the standard is too severe and should be
relaxed or that it is trivial and should be raised. The evaluator
may choose disaggregate measures of the quality of service (e.g. driver
courtesy) or statistics which represent the quality of service (e.g.
passengers/revenue vehicle hour). The particular measures selected
should depend on the state's goals and the method of administering
the program.
The various programs which have been developed represent
three methods to administer a performance based allocation:
1) Transit agencies are required to conduct performance
evaluations (or supply the necessary data) and meet
minimum standardsfor specific measures on a periodic
basis in order to be eligible to receive their full
share of state funding.
2) Bonuses and penalties are determined by spot checks
on performance (and inherent standards for minimum
performance).
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3) Funds are allocated to transit agencies according to a
formula which includes performance measures.
The following sections describe programs in five different states
which link performance evaluations to the allocation of state
operating assistance.
3.1 Periodic Performance Evaluation With Minimum Standards
Programs of the category require transit operators to submit
specific data to the state periodically. If the state determines that
the performance of a property does not meet the established minimum
standards, the amount of state assistance pro vided is reduced.
Both the state of California and the state .of New York have
mandated that transit operators conduct periodic-performance evaluations
in order to receive the maximum state operating assistance. The
amount of assistance received by an operator is not directly related
to performance of a specified measure or measures; the total amount of
assistance received is dependent upon the completio n of a performance
evaluation and the attainment of minimum standards'.
In California, the completion of a performance evaluation and
attainment of a minimum farebox recovery ratio are prerequisites for
state assistance. While in New York, the operator must be certified
as "economic" and "efficient" in order to receive all of the state
funding for which it is eligible. In neither state are financial
rewards attached to the results of the performance evaluation, but
both states specify performance measures which should be reviewed in
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the evaluation. These measures are monitored in an attempt to identify
problem areas and to suggest where improvements in the property's
performance may be made. Each of these programs is discussed below.
3.1.1 California
The state of California imposes two requirements upon transit
operators in the state in order to be eligible to receive state
transit assistance:
1. A performance audit must be conducted every three years.
2. A minimum recovery ratio must be maintained.()
The Transit Development Act (TDA) was passed in July 1980.
This legislation requires all transit operators to undergo an
independent performance audit every three years to evaluate the
efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of the operation. The
following performance indicators are mandated for review:
o Operating Cost/Passenger
o Operating Cost/Vehicle Service Hour
o Passengers/Vehicle Service Hour
o Passengers/Vechile Service Mile
O Vehicle Service Hours/Employee
The TDA also states that the audit shall include consideration of
the needs and types of passengers, and the employment of part-time
drivers and outside contracts for service provision during the peak.(2)
Minimum standards or criteria have not been defined for any of
the above measures. Thus, no penalties or bonuses are associated with
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the results of the performance audit. The TDA only requires that
the audit be conducted every three years (beginning 1980) by an
independent auditor.
The second requirement defines a minimum farebox recovery
ratio (fare revenue/operating cost) which must be achieved for a
system to be eligible for state funds. Initially, statewide minimum
recovery ratios were set at the 1978/79 level or 20% for systems in
urbanized areas and 10% for systems in non-urbanized areas, whichever
is higher. (3) However, this ratio was too trivial for many of the
larger operations but extremely challenging for the small operations.
Therefore, the minimum farebox recovery ratio requirement was
adjusted. The state gave the Regional Transportation Planning
Associations (RTPA) the authority to determine the minimum farebox
recovery ratio for operators in their respective jurisdictions. (4
Therefore, operators in different regions within the state may have
different minimum farebox recovery ratios, yet each must meet its
specific level to receive state transit assistance.
The performance audit requirement in California is not related
to the distribution of funds between operators in the state. Rather,
it is of an all-or-nothing nature: the system either undergoes a
performance audit every three years and maintains the specified
minimum recovery ratio and receives all of its state assistance,
or the system fails to meet one or both of the requirements and
receives no state assistance.
-50-
The program provides no financial incentives to improve
performance of the indicators mandated for review. The program
merely monitors the selected indicators once every three years.
Although the audit may be used diagnostically to identify areas
where performance is poor for a more thorough investigation to
identify potential improvements, it may not be effective if there
is no follow-up action. However, the performance of a system may
improve merely because it is being monitored or because previously
unknown problems are identified. Even if the audit does identify
ways to improve performance, the system has no incentive to implement
action to improve performance until just prior to the next audit
(2 - 3 years later).
Without follow-up action on areas with "poor" performance, Cali-
fornia's program does not provide any strong, direct incentives
to improve performance. The evaluation is too infrequent and its
results do not have any consequences attached.
The measures which are mandated for review have their own
respective problems, discussed in Chapter 5. Although the TDA states
that the audit shall consider the needs and types of passengers,
and the use of part-time drivers and outside contracts for
service provision, the measures mandated for review conflict with
these intentions. The measures which contain operating expenses are
biased against systems whose work rules prevent the use of part-time
services. The indicators which measure passengers do not identify
the type of transportation needs of the passenger. If the state
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truly wants to consider these factors, more appropriate indicators
should be used (e.g. the number of elderly and handicapped persons
served/the number of elderly and handicapped in the region).
3.1.2 New York State
The New York State transit operating assistance program was
initiated in 1974. The state legislation which established this
program (Section 18b of the Transportation Law) requires the
Commissioner of Transportation to report annually on such factors
as "utilization, productivity, and integration.....quality and
availability of public transportation services".(5) This program
provides state payments to bus, commuter rail, commuter ferry, and
rapid rail systems based on ridership (revenue passengers) and
service level (revenue vehicle miles) provided. The program also
requires a specified level of local contribution. Initially, funds
were granted to systems with the implicit assumption that they would
be used for service which is both necessary and cost-effective.(6)
However, as the program grew and the disparity between state and
local funding levels increased, interest at the state level shifted
to assuring that these funds would be used efficiently and economically.
This intent has been intensified by the increased pressure for
accountability in government expenditures.
In response to these pressures, the New York State legislature
required that, after July 1, 1979, subsidy payments made by the
state in excess of the required level of local matching funds (up to
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1/3 of the state assistance)be made only to operators which the State
Transportation Department certified as being "economic and efficient".
This mandate inspired the New York State DOT to develop a performance
evaluation program in 1979. The goals of controlling costs and
improving transit performance formed the basis for the state's
performance evaluation program (7, which incorporated the following
objectives:
(1) Performance criteria should ensure that services are
being provided in a cost effective manner at reasonable
service levels.
(2) Performance criteria should be applicable to the various
modes and service types for which state assistance is
intended.
(3) Performance criteria should be simple and as directly
applicable as possible, but they should not unfairly
penalize an operator for factors over which he has no
control.
(4) Performance criteria should focus on the major determinants
of transit costs and revenues.
(5) Performance criteria should be incentive-oriented to
the maximum extent feasible.
The New York State DOT evaluated fifty different performance
measures in terms of these objectives. When reviewing the indicators,
it was recognized that indicators which used the measure "vehicle-hours"
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reduce the differences in performance encountered when using "vehicle
miles", a term which is inherently biased against slower systems.
However, it was also clear that the measure "vehicle hours" does not
provide a fair comparison between commuter-oriented and general
services. In recognition of the biases inherent in each of these
measures, the indicators were grouped into sets of alternatives
(including both measures) so that it is reasonable to expect all
operators to attain a satisfactory level of at least one indicator
in each paired set. -Fifteen performance measures were selected as
valuable and possible to apply-in a reasonably equitable manner to
various modes and service types. These measures appear in Table 3.1.
A discussion of each of these measures, the rationale for their
selection, and their potential usefulness in evaluation of system
performance is presented in Appendix A.
An initial attempt to establish standards for each of the
performance indicators was made using FY1978-79 data. Using this
data (obtained from operators participating in the state/local
operating assistance program) the mean scores and the standard
deviations were calculated. The results were to be used to define an
optimal level of performance for each indicator. However, the
effort produced widely divergent statistics and the DOT abandoned
this approach to determining performance standards. Instead, a level
of acceptable and desirable performance was set for each measure based
on a review of state and national performance data and performance of
individual operators was compared with these standards for certification.
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Table 3.1.
Performance Measures
Source: Keck, Zerrillo, and Schneider (1980), pp. 360-363
Type of Measure What it Measures Measure
Efficiency Labor Productivity rev. cap. hr./emp. hr.
rev. cap. mi./emp. hr.
Vehicle Utilization rev. veh. hr./veh.
rev. veh. mi./veh.
Economy Service Cost - op. cost/cap. hr.
op. cost/cap. mi.
Self-sufficiency op. rev./exp.
op. rev. + excess local/
pass. mi.
Effectiveness Usage Levels rev. pass./rev. veh. hr.
rev. pass./rev. veh. mi.
rev. pass. mi./rev. cap.
mi.
Passenger Unit Cost op. cost/rev. pass. mil.
deficit/rev. pass. mi.
Labor/Usage Relation- rev. pass./emp. hr.
ship
rev. pass. mi./emp. hr.
rev. = revenue, cap. = capacity, hr. = hour, emp. = employee, mi. = mile,
op. = operating, exp. = expense, pass. = passenger, excess local = local
assistance above the required match.
-55-
Table 3.2 shows the range of data, preliminary guidelines of acceptable
and desirable levels, and the percentage of properties meeting these
levels. Systems which were not certified in this fashion had their
supplementary operating assistance withheld until certification was
achieved.
The program was limited in FY1980-81 to apply to only major public
transportation systems (more than one million vehicle miles of service
annually or more than one million passengers annually). In FY1981-82
evaluation was based on "system" (vs. individual property) performance
to reflect the structure of the state operating assistance program.
The "system" includes all operators serving the same geographic area,
particularly where service and financing policies are controlled by
a single local agency (8) This change, however, has the possible
negative effect of obscuring the poor (or excellent) performance of
an individual operator in the system average.
An additional requirement of a service evaluation plan was also
added in FY1981-82. This plan was to include information about the
following areas for each major transit system .
(1) local transit service objectives
(2) the extent of transit system and route performance evaluation
(3) transit service coordination
(4) short-term transit service problems and needs.
This information was to provide a basis for relating transit system
performance to local service objectives and to improve performance
monitoring.
Table 3.2
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
PERFORMANCEHCRITERIA DEVELOPED FOR USE WITH NYS TRANSIT SYSTEMS
Range ol Operator
Criteria Data
Preliminary
Acceptable
Level
Guidelines
Desirable
Level
Perecent Meeting
Guidelines
Acceptable Desirable
EFFICIENCY
1. Rev. Capacity Hours
per Employee Hour
OR
Rev. Capacity Miles
per Employee Hour
2. Rev. Vehicle Hours
per Rev. Vehicle
OR
Rev. Vehicle Miles
per Rev. Vehicle
2 - 134
95 - 4860
347 - 5007
7896 - 83333 e
ECONOMY
3. Oper. Cost per
Capacity Mile
OR
Oper. Cost per
Capacity Hour
4. Oper. Revenue as a
percent of Oper. Cost
OR
Oper. Rev. plus Excess
Local per Pass. Mile.
<$0.01 - $0.17
$0.07 - $4.37
.01 - 1.82
$0.02 - 1.22c $0.04 $0.06
15 25
150
750
10000
250
1500
15000
86.2
96.3
93.6
95.4
63.3
83.5
67.0
91.7
$0.10
$0.85
.50
$0.05
$0.50
.75
94.5
84.4
62.4
88.1
67.9
36.7
IUl
93.6 82.6
Table. 3.2 continued...../
Range of Operator
Criteria Dataa
EFFECTIVENESS
Preliminary
Acceptable
Level
Guidelines
Desirable
Level
Percent Meeting
Guidelines
Acceptable Desirable
5. Rev. Passengers
per Rev. Vehicle Hour
OR
Rev. Passenger Miles
per Rev. Vehicle Hour
OR
Rev. Passenger Miles
per Capacity Mile
6. Oper. Cost per Rev.
Passenger Mile
OR
Deficit per Rev.
Passenger Mile
7. Passengers per
Employee Hour
OR
Passenger Miles per
Employee Hour
1 - 79
5 - 22089
.01 - 1.05
.02 - 1.97
Net Profit - 1.56
< 1 - 39
< 1 - 1429
Based on data submitted by operators in
Inaccurate data of one operator reports
Inaccurate data of one operator reports
Inaccurate data of one operator reports
Inaccurate data of one operator reports
Inaccurate data of one operator reports
Inaccurate data of one operator reports
response to NYSDOT
a value of 18.63
a value of $2.99
a value of 7416
a value of 389,497
a value of 889
a value of 4446.
Source: Zerrillo, Keck and Schneider (1981), page 13.
5
10
.05
$1.20
$0.40
5
5
10
20
.10
$0.60
$0.20
10
10
91.7
96.3
89.0
94.5
86.2
78.9
96.3
77.1
89.0
73.4
86.2
77.1
52.3
89.9
UJ1
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
request
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In FY1982-83, transit properties were stratified into peer
groups on the basis of mode, service type, and vehicle fleet size to
facilitate comparisons between operators by reducing the differences
between systems being compared. Thirteen groups were defined:
Group 1: Urban bus with 25 or less vehicles
Group 2: Urban bus with 26 to 125 vehicles
Group 3: Urban bus with 126 to 500 vehicles
Group 4: Urban bus with more than 500 vehicles
Group 5: Commuter bus with 20 or less vehicles
Group 6: Commuter bus with more than 20 vehicles
Group 7: Intercity bus with 20 or less vehicles
Group 8: Intercity bus with more than 20 vehicles
Group 9: Combined demlanfd responsive and fixed route service
Group 10: Demand responsive service
Group 11: Rapid transit
Group 12: Commuter Rail
Group 13: Commuter Ferry
The performance of individua -operators was compared with empirically
defined threshold levels for each group. These threshold levels,
if not met, serve as trigger mechanisms for additional analysis and
potential state management assistance .
The current New York State DOT transit evaluation process has
been modified to a program which concentrates on more precisely
identifying where improvements can be made by :
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(1) assessing the trends in performance of transit
operations over time
(2) assessing the performance of individual operators as well
as groupings of operators comprising a country or regional
transit system
(3) reviewing performance relative to a peer group.
The current methodology for NYSDOT's performance evaluation is
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The performance review occurs in three
stages. The first stage consists of data collection and analysis
including time-series analysis and peer group comparison. The next
phase is a review of service and fare policy, including meetings with
operators to review the results of the performance report from phase 1.
This review is to determine whether the operator is aware of performance
differences or problems; identify special local conditions; identify
current efforts to alleviate problems; and determine theineed for
additional evaluation or actions to improve performance.(12)
The final stage, which uses the results of the previous two
stages as inputs, involves the review of these results and subsequent
Department action. The Department may choose to certify the agency or,
if performance problems are identified, determine (along with the opera-
tor) a strategy to improve performance. Once the operator takes the
appropriate actions to improve performance, the agency will be certified.
New York State DOT is conducting research aimed at expanding the
current transit performance evaluation program to include measures of
seryice quality. Four categories of preliminary service quality measures
NYSDOT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROCESS
SERVICE AND
FARE POLICY
PLAN REVIEW
TIME SERIES
DATA
SOURCES
PE ER COMPARIO
CERTIFICATIO
CONFERENCE WITH OPERATOR
PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION
APPRO
INADEQUATE
ACTION
WITHHOLDING
OF STATE AID
PRIATE ACTION
Figure 1
Source: 1982 Report on Transit Operating Performance in New York State
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have been identified for use by NYSDOT to help explain changes in
efficiency and effectiveness measures. The four categories, a
description of each, and the corresponding service quality measures are
shown in Table 3.3.
The New York State transit evaluation takes a diagnostic approach.
By comparing an agency's performance over time and with other agencies
in its peer group, the evaluation process is used to identify potential
problems. However, rather than using only aggregate measures of agency
performance, NYSDOT (along with the operator) investigates the possible
reasons for poor (or excellent) performance. NYSDOT also works with
the operator to determine where improvements can be made consistent with
local objectives. No funding has been withheld to date, although some
properties received certification conditional upon a plan to improve
performance.
Although the NYSDOT's performance evaluation program has
existed for several years, this is the first year that the DOT has made
sure that the operators are aware of the results of the comprehensive
evaluation of operating performance of the state's major transit systems.
This information may increase the pressure on transit properties to
improve their performance.
The NY State program has evolved in an attempt to avoid problems
common to many performance evaluation programs. Perhaps the most
important improvement in the program was the elimination of a bottom line
minimum standard based on the mean and standard deviation of groups of
systems. The diagnostic approach to performance evaluation recognizes
Table 3.3.
Service Quality Measures
Source: Zerrillo & Barbour (1982)
Description
1. Service Availability
2. Service Reliability
A. Equipment Availa-
bility
B. Operations
C. Maintenance
The amount of transit service provided
to the public in terms of frequency,
miles, and hours of operation.
Broad category relating to the
quality of transit service as
perceived by the rider.
Measures the number of vehicles
available for daily service.
Measures of reliability directly
related to vehicle operation.
Measures of Reliability largely
influenced by maintenance practices.
Hours of daily service,(rail
& bus),Number of trains
scheduled (rail), Number of
buses scheduled (bus),
Headway (rail and bus),
Revenue Vehicle Miles and
Hours (rail and bus).
Vehicle shortages (rail & bus)
Vehicles out of service (rail
& bus)
On-time Performance-Peak and
Daily (rail and bus)
Average speed (rail and bus)
Trains cancelled as % of trains
scheduled (rail)
Mean distance between failures (rail)
Mean distance between delays (rail
& bus)
Miles between road calls (bus)
Trips missed (bus)
cont'd/...next page
Category Measures
Table 3.3. cont'd.
Category
3. Passenger Comfort
4. Safety/Security
Description
Measures of the quality of
service in terms of the passenger's
environment.
Measures of accidents occuring
on the system.
Measures of passenger safety
from crime.
Measures
Percent cars/buses with air
conditioning malfunctioning
Percent cards with door mal-
functioning
Passengers per seat
Passengers per square foot of
floor space
Accidents by type
Accidents per 100,000 miles
Passenger accidents per 1 million
pass.
Crime per 1 million pass.
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that there are differences between systems and that factors which are
out of the operator's control may influence the performance of the
system. In light of these factors, the state does not base funding
on any bottom line measures of performance. Instead, it attempts to
identify areas which require further attention, review these areas
to determine if problems exist, and (if problems are discovered) the
State provides assistance to the operator to devise an approach to
resolve the problems.
By monitoring performance, the quality of service, and
investigating causes of inadequate performance, this program may:
(1) increase the understanding of transit operations by
state officials.
(2) identify opportunities to improve transit performance.
(3) increase operators' knowledge of techniques to improve
performance by facilitating the exchange of information
between operators.
(4) increase accountability in the use of public funds.
(5) provide incentives to improve performance.
Although no direct financial incentive is provided to improve
a particular measure(s), the performance of the properties as
defined by the measures which are monitored,may improve simply because
they are being monitored and because of the certification requirement.
However, the fact that a system may receive a conditional certification
based on presentation of a service plan to improve performance may
reduce this second incentive since the operator may receive his funding
either way.
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Because the operator is likely to try to improve performance
of the property on the measures which are being monitored, it is
essential to understand the performance measures and how they
can be improved. It is also important to determine whether or not
improvement of these measures indicates attainment of the state's goals.
For example, many of the performance measures utilized include revenue
capacity hours or revenue vehicle hours as measures of produced
service in order to reduce the bias against congested routes in vehicle
miles. These are not measures of produced service, however, since a
passenger places very little value on sitting in a stationary bus for
an hour. The various measures used in performance evaluations are
critically appraised in Chapter 5,,
3.1.3 Discussion
The programs discussed above do not relate funding directly to
performance on a specified measure or measures. This approach results
in an all-or-nothing allocation of funding. The California program
represents the extreme case of such a program; it does not attach
any significance to the results of the performance audit, it merely
requires that a performance audit is conducted. The California
program provides little, if any, direct incentive to improve
performance.
New York's program, however, goes one step further by estab-
lishing a certification requirement based on attainment of acceptable
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levels of performance. No bonuses are allocated to reward superior
performance, but a penalty (of up to 1/3 of the State assistance) is
assessed against systems which do not perform well enough to be
certified. Again, this is an all-or-nothing penalty.
Since neither of the two programs discussed provide positive
reenforcement of agencies for good performance, and because they
provide all-or-nothing penalties for failing to meet the requirements,
they may not consistently encourage improvement of performance. The
programs, however, do encourage transit agencies to maintain some
minimum level of service (as defined in the requirements).
3.2 Bonuses and Penalties Determined by Spot Checks
An. evaluation program which is based on spot checks reduces the
cost associated with regular, periodic data collection since it relies
on unscheduled checks on the service provided. By evaluating systems on
thel basis of spot checks, the program does not provide the opportunity
for data manipulation. However, an evaluation program which relies on
spot checks has the possibility of leading to a misallocation of rewards
or penalties for the following reasons:
(1) The evaluation may only be representative of one
particular condition (resulting from weather conditions,
day of the week, or hour of the day). The definitions of
"acceptable" and "unacceptable" may be different under
different conditions and the evaluation must account for
these factors. For example, higher levels of crowding
are acceptable during peak periods than during off peak periods.
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(2) The sampling plan, which is the combination of
sample size (quantity of data) and timing of data
collection, may be inadequate.* The result of an
inadequate sampling plan may be that the particular unit
(driver, vehicle, route, etc.) which is evaluated may
not be representative. For example, an operator who has
been harrassed by passengers may not be as courteous
as usual,
For these reasons the program may not accurately judge "good"
and "poor" performance of a property, and therefore may actually
reward (penalize) systems which provide on overall low (high) level
of service because the unit which happened to be evaluated performed
well (poorly).
A program which evaluates the level of service by using spot
checks was developed for the State of New Jersey. This program,which
includes both rewards for "good" performance and penalties for "poor"
performance, is discussed below.
3.2.1. New Jersey
The New Jersey Department of Transportation, prior to 1981, was
responsible for administering public transit assistance within the state.
* The concept of sampling and the statistical and practical issues
related to determining sample size are discussed in Chapter 4
(pp. 39 - 74) of the UMTA Report: Bus Transit Monitoring Manual,
Volume 1: Data Collection Design, Attanucci, Burns, and Wilson.
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The DOT entered into service contracts with individual operators, which
specified frequency of service, stops, and equipment as qualifiers for
state transit assistance. Operators did not receive state assistance
unless they maintained the minimum service levels specified in the
service contract.
In 1976, the DOT developed an incentive program aimed at
improving the quality of bus service in New Jersey. The desired
improvements in bus service were to: (1) increase the passengers'
satisfaction with the service, (2) attract additional riders at the
same level of service, and (3) increase farebox revenues, which
would benefit both the carriers and the state.(13)
The incentive system was designed to provide financial rewards to
carriers for providing quality service and to penalize carriers for
providing service below the levels established in the purchase of
service contract. The incentive system was to be administered by
spot checks on the various operators in the state. The evaluators
used a passenger's point of view to determine quality of service,
e.g. an evaluator would board a bus as a passenger in order to
evaluate operator courtesy.
The incentive program monitored disaggregate observable
characteristics of service quality rather than the traditional
efficiency and effectiveness indicators, since many factors which
affect the results of the traditional evaluations are specific to a
particular operating environment and are outside the operator's
control. The evaluators used garage, riding, and street checks.
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The types of indicators of service quality evaluated by each of the
three types of checks appear in Table 3.4. below.
The indicators used in this type of evaluation are necessarily
observable, and the traditional performance indicators used by the
other programs are inappropriate for this type of monitoring (e.g.
one cannot evaluate the revenue/expense ratio by a spot check).
This program relies quite heavily on rather subjective
evaluation of the quality of service. Many of the designated indicators
are not readily quantifiable, and therefore do not lend themselves
to summarization in performance statistics. Therefore, the evaluation
is based on a subjective assessment of each characteristic. The "score"
which a given property receives may differ between evaluators because
of the problems associated with defining bounds on qualitative terms.
The program is different from other performance-based allocation
programs in that it does not evaluate all systems on the basis of
periodic submittal of operating data, but rather by spot checks on the
service. The intent of the program is to judge the operator's perfor-
mance on the basis of a representative sample. However, since the
operator is not required to submit the complete data set of each
period, the incentive to improve performance is dependent upon the
frequency of the spot checks and the consequent probability that a
specific unit will be evaluated on a given day (or, more generally, the
sample size and accuracy). Therefore, the day(s) on which the spot
check is conducted may not be a representative sample.
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Table 3.4
Service Quality Indicators
Type of Check
Garage Check
Riding Check
Street Check
Indicator of Service Quality
. Vehicle Cleanliness
. Vehicle Defects
. Operator Courtesy
. Operator's Handling of the Vehicle
. Crowding Level
. On-time Performance
. Reliability
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3.2.2 Discussion
Performance-based subsidy allocation programs such as
New Jersey's may provide grater potential for achieving their stated
objectives since the bonuses and penalties are associated with the
results of the performance evaluation. The major problem with the
New Jersey program is that it is executed on a somewhat arbitrary
basis.
The New Jersey program was intended to evaluate the quality of
service as opposed to its efficiency, equity, and effectiveness. The
fact that New Jersey's transit service was provided by service
contracts which specify minimum levels of service makes this type of
program feasible. Many operators-in.other-states, however, do not
have any mandated minimum level of service. Therefore, it is
important for subsidy allocation programs to- focus on a possible state
goal of providing a minimum level of Service.
3.3 Performance-Based Formula
Programs in this category allocate transit assistance according
to a predefined formula which includes measures of performance. Transit
properties are required to submit to the DOT periodic data on perfor-
mance and are rewarded for "good" performance on the specified measures.
Two states have implemented programs in this category -- Pennsylvania
and Iowa.
The implementation of these two programs, however, is quite
different. Pennsylvania's program provides bonuses based on improve-
ment in performance of the specified measures. The amount of bonus
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rewarded is determined by a percentage of the non-federal deficit.
Only a small percentage of the total state subsidy is allocated to
reward improvements of these measures. Iowa provides assistance
according to a formula which includes various measures of need, local
support, quantity of service provided and performance. The two
programs are discussed in the following sections.
3.3.1 Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has been providing operating assistance to transit
systems since 1967. Prior to the spring of 1980, the state's
operating assistance was administered on a discretionary basis. This
approach to fund allocation was aicceptable when the number of program
applicants-was small enough to allow the state to carefully review
all projects. This effort was guided by an extensive data reporting
system which was developed by the Bureau of Mass Transit Systems of
the PADOT. However, as the number of program applicants increased
during the 1970's, it became increasingly difficult to administer
operating assistance on a discretionary basis.
In response to the increasing dissatisfaction with the alloca-
tion of operating assistance, the Bureau began to develop a formula
grant methodology in fiscal year 1976-77. This formula was intended
to address the following problems:
(1) inadequate overall transit funding
(2) uncertainty as to expected levels of state transit
funding for individual systems.
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(3) inequity in transit funding.
The formula methodology which the Bureau developed was first
implemented in FY1977-78 on an experimental basis and refined over the
next two years. The bill (SB881) which presented the final formula was
passed in the Spring of FY1979-80 and became effective immediately;
it was entitled Act 101, the "Pennsylvania Urban Mass Transporation
Law".
The formula divided the calculation of state operating grants
into two parts: (1) determination of financial need, and (2) evaluation
of performance. The financial need component.was intended to erase the
perception of unlimited state transit assistance. This perception
was believed to be a deterent in obtaining legislative approval for
increases in the annual state transit operating assistance appropriation.(1 4)
The performance evaluation component was to provide a financial incentive
for transit systems to improve their overall efficiency, effectiveness,
and utilization. It was also intended to reduce the distortive incen-
tives which may result from rewarding systems which have higher deficits.
Ninety percent of the state appropriation is awarded to individual
systems based on Beed; this portion is referred to as the basic grant.
The remaining ten percent is allocated based on system performance.
The process used to determine each of these amounts is discussed below.
3.3.1.1. The Basic Grant
The determination of financial need consists of five steps:
(1) Determine the constrained operating expense for each
system.
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(2) Determine "reasonable" operating revenue projections
for each system.
(3) Calculate the constrained operating deficit for each
system.
(4) Calculate the constrained non-federal deficit.
(5) Calculate the basic grant.
Each of these steps is explained below.
(1) Determine the Constrained Operating Expenses
Each system is required to include a projection of its operating
expense in its budget projections for the upcoming year. In an effort
to assure that the financial need-projected by transit systems in their
budgets is not excessive relative to inflation, the Bureau applies a
"maximum expense factor". This factor represents a ceiling on the
percentage increase in transit operating expenses. The "maximum
expense factor" is determined by the aggregate percentage increase in
transit operating expenses of the Pennsylvania transit industry for
the previous year from the penultimate year and an inflation factor
equal to 1.15. Calculation of the "maximum expense factor" is shown
below:
E' - E
Maximum Expense Factor = 1.15 ( )
E
Where E' = previous year PA transit industry expenses
E = penultimate year PA transit industry expenses.
The Bureau, in effect, disallows any cost increases greater than
the "maximum expense factor" by constraining any operating expense
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increases which are greater than this factor (i.e. if a system's
percentage increase is greater than the "maximum expense factor",
the Bureau calculates this system's grant based upon application of
the "maximum expense factor" to the expenses of the penultimate
year).
(2) Determine "Reasonable" Operating Revenue Projections
Once the operating expenses are projected, the next step
involves calculating "reasonable" operating revenues. "Reasonable"
operating revenues are defined as those which are equal to or greater
than the "minimum level of assumed revenue". The "minimum level of
assumed revenue" is determined by calculating the appropriate
annual assumed revenue/expense ratio and multiplying it by the
projected or formula operating expenses, whichever is less. The
annual assumed revenue/expense ratio represents the lowest allowable
percentage of operating expenses that revenues are expected to cover
and are given for the years 1980 through 1985 in Table 3.5.
The minimum revenue/expense ratio was developed to help assure
that the increase in transit revenues kept pace with the increase in
transit expenses over time. (15) Prior to Act 101 (1980), the minimum
operating revenue was determined by calculating a minimum revenue/
expense ratio with a downward sliding scale of required revenue/expense
ratios over time. The downward sliding scale was adopted in recogni-
tion of the trend of declining revenue/expense ratios. The FY1976-77
average revenue/expense ratio for the state's urbanized transit
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Table 3.5
Assumed Revenue/Expense Ratios
FY > 20 Vehicles < 20 Vehicles
1980-81 48% 38%
1981-82 48% 38%
1982-83 46% 36%
1983-84 44% 34%
1984-85 42% 32%
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systems was 50%; this ratio was used as a baseline. From that period
on, a downward sliding scale of 2 1/2% per year was used to require
revenue to increase at 1/2 the rate of the "maximum expense factor".
The initial decreasing scale was revised during 1979-80 changes
to a 2% annual decline. The initial and revised scales appear in
Table 3.6, along with those actual used as a result of the enactment
of Act 101. The sliding scale decrease in minimum revenue/expense
ratio policy was to result in periodic, rather than annual fare
increases (since fare increases occur in at least 5t increments).
(3) Calculate Constrained Operating Deficit
The constrained operating deficit is calculated by subtracting
the minimum operating revenue (based on the minimufi revenue/expense
ratio) from the maximum allowable operating expenses (based on the
maximum expense factor).
Act 101 requires that minimum revenue equal to the amount needed
to attain the appropriate annual assumed revenue/expense ratio be
used to calculate the constrained non-federal deficit.(16) Transit
systems that project revenue in excess of the "minimum level of assumed
revenue"1 are allowed to use this revenue to offset projected expenses in
excess of the "maximum expense factor".
(4) Determine the Constrained Non-Federal Deficit
The constrained non-federal deficit represents the total amount
of the constrained operating deficit which is not reimbursed by Federal
Section 5.
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Table 3.6
Minimum Revenue/Expense Ratios
FY Initial Standard Revised Standard Actual Standard*
1976 - 77 50% 50%
1977 - 78 47 1/2% 48% -
1978 - 79 45% 46% 45%
1979 - 80 42 1/2% 44% 46%
1980 - 81 40% 42% 48%
1981 - 82 - 40% 48%
1982 - 83 - - 46%
1983 - 84 - 44%
1984 - 85 - 42%
* These are the standards which are included in Act 101
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Constrained Constrained Projected
Non-Federal = Operating - Section 5
Deficit Deficit Subsidy
(5) Calculate the Basic Grant
The basic grant is the amount of money a system receives based
on need. The basic grant is 66 2/3% of the constrained non-federal
deficit, which represents 90% of the maximum authorized state funding
level of 75% of the non-federal operating deficit.
3.3.1.2 Performance Bonuses
The remaining 10% of the state funding (8 1/3% of the constrained
non-federal deficit) is awarded to systems which show progress in
achieving the goals of maximizing ridership and revenue per unit
of service. 17 ) The following four performance indicators are used
to monitor each system's progress toward achievement:
(1) tevenue passengers/vehicle hour
(2) operating revenue/vehicle hour
(3) operating expense/vehicle hour
(4) revenue/operating expense ratio
Each performance indicator has a financial reward equal to 2% of the
constrained non-federal deficit attached to it, with the exception of
revenue passengers/vehicle hour which is worth 2 1/3%.
The actual award of performance bonuses is determined according
to the following criteria:
(1) if the ratio of revenue passengers/vehicle hour is higher
than the previous year, no matter how much higher
-80-
(2) if the ratio of operating revenue/vehicle hour is
higher than the previous year, no matter how much higher
(3) if the ratio of operating expense/vehicle hour increased
less than the percentage increase in the appropriate
"maximum expense factor", no matter to what degree
(4) if the ratio of operating revenue/operating expense
decreased less than 2%, no matter to what degree
The award of bonuses is based on actual, rather than projected,
system performance, but Act 101 also requires that performance bonuses
be determined before the appropriation. These two factors results in
a two year lag in the rewards, since the budget must be prepared one
year before the new fiscal year. This is a change from the initial
procedure developed by the Bureau, which allowed the Bureau to request
the maximum potential amount of funding. Act 101 eliminated the
flaw of the earlier budget policy, which could have resulted in excess
bonus funds if all systems did not earn all four rewards.
The allocation formula used in Pennsylvania results in a
budgetary process based on projection of "need". The actual award
of grant money, however, is based upon each system's project
application (which is filed one year after the budget submission and
contains updated data). The same process is used to determine both
the budgetary financial need and the actual state grants.
The sum of the calculated state transit grants to the operators
may be different than the amount provided by the appropriation; any
such difference, positive or negative, is balanced by a straight
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pro-rating of all individual system grants.
This formula is used to allocate state funds to systems in the
thirteen urbanized areas of the state. The Bureau is currently trying
to develop a performance-based formula for allocating operating
subsidies to the rural and small urban areas of the state. Currently,
grants are allocated to these systems based on constrained operating
deficits and required federal, state, and local shares. The Bureau
also provides performance guidelines for these systems, but adherance
to these guidelines has no direct effect on the amount of assistance
received.
The program for allocating operating subsidies in Pennsylvania
may not be sufficient once an operator has attained the maximum level
of performance on the monitored measures. In a sense, this may
provide a distortive incentive to perform poorly one year in order to
allow enough room for improvement over many years (so as to receive the
bonus funds every year) or to improve performance in small increments
so that the potential of earning the bonuses is, again, spread over many
years. This second distortive incentive may be compounded by the fact
that any increment of improvement, no matter how small, is rewarded.
The Pennsylvania program offers clear identification of the basis
on which funding will be allocated. The direct relationship between
performance and bonuses may increase the probability of a successful
program (as opposed to program which include the performance indicators
in a formula with various other terms) since the operator clearly
understands what variables to focus upon in order to earn the bonuses.
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The performance-based subsidy allocation program in Pennsylvania
may alleviate some of the problems which the state found in the
discretionary approach to operating subsidy allocation. The use of
performance measures increases accountability in the use of public
funds. By attaching financial incentives to these measures, the
program provides incentives to the operator to improve performance
(as defined by these measures). The combination of increased
accountability and increased incentives to improve performance may
result in larger appropriations from the state legislature which may
relieve (or at least reduce) the inadequacy of overall funding.
The inclusion of determination of need may also improve the
chances for increased overall funding when the performance of the
operators is also being monitored because the legislature may gain
an increased understanding of the costs of providing transit service.
The fact that operating expenses are constrained to a maximum rate
of increase which is in line with inflation may facilitate this
effort.
A comprehensive analysis of the performance-based operating
assistance program in Pennsylvania is presented in Chapter 4.
3.3.2 Iowa
Operating assistance to transit was initiated in the state of
Iowa in November 1976. The aim of these funds is to facilitate system
development and improved performance as stated explicitly by the
Public Transit Division of the Iowa DOT:
-83-
"The Iowa Department of Transporation, and its Public Transit
Division, in particular, is principally concerned with
"public" transportation. Certain segments of the public,
such as the handicapped or elderly, may be given priority
treatment by transit systems that receive state assistance.
However, the Public Transit Division does not fund transit
services for exclusive client groups.
Rather, Iowa's Transit Assistance Program is "assistance
with development (innovation, new projects, expansion)", with
"improved performance (management and operations)", and with
''coordination/consolidation of resources". This program is
our commitment to improve the efficiency and level of service
to the citizens of the state of Iowa".
Assistance was allocated to the individual agencies on a discretionary
basis, but as the program matured, this approach to operating assistance
allocation became less acceptable. As with Pennsylvania, the increasing
number of properties involved in the program made it more difficult
to administer operating assistance in a discretionary manner. In 1977,
dissatisfaction with the discretionary approach led the State Transit
Advisory Committee to search for a better approach to allocating state
operating subsidies. They sought a formula which(18).
(1) considered system size
(2) rewarded improvements in performance (efficiency &
effectiveness)
(3) promoted regional transit systems
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(4) encouraged transit managers to raise money locally.
This search, which extended over four years, illustrates the
difficulty in trying to get different interests to agree on an allocation
methodology. Two formulas (Appendix B) were presented by university
professors in 1978; complete agreement between all interests was not
attainable, and therefore neither proposal was accepted. In 1979,
Iowa DOT decided to adopt a modification of one of the formulas for
allocation of Section 18 funds. However, pressure from transit
managers still existed for a performance-based formula for the allocation
of state funds. The Public Transit Division staff of the Iowa DOT
responsed with a proposal of its own.
The new proposal from the Iowa DOT was presented to the Iowa
Public Transporation Association (IPTA) and the State Transporation
Commission in January 1980. The State Transportation Commission
rejected this formula and decided to maintain the -discretionary
funding process for one more year while studying alternative formulas
further. Both the Public Transit Division and IPTA developed formulas in
1980, which were presented to the Iowa State Transportation Commission
in September 1980. Due to opposition from some transit managers, all
recommendations were rejected, and the DOT staff and IPTA were instructed
to work together in developing a single proposal.
Through this effort, a formula was finally proposed which was
agreed upon by all interests. The State Transportation Commission
adopted the formula in February 1981 and it is now used to allocate
operating assistance in the state of Iowa.
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The Iowa Department of Transportation provides operating
assistance to thirty-three transit systems in the state. Fifteen of these
systems are regional systems and the remaining seventeen are urban
operations. The DOT treats urban and regional systems separately, in
recognition of the difficulty of comparing across the two categories.
Since the DOT feels that the concept of regional systems should be
promoted to emphasize the ideas of consolidation and coordination, a
special category is created in the fund allocation methodology for this
type of system.
Funding allocations are broken down into three categories. The
first category is a discretionary account, the second is for regional
operating assistance, and the third is for project funding. Each of
these categories, as Well as the allocation of funds to individual
systems within each category, is defined below.
3.3.2.1 Special Projects Fund
If the state transit assistance appropriation is at least
$500,000, $ 300,000 is taken off-the-top and allocated to a special
projects fund. This fund is to be distributed on a discretionary
basis according to the merit of each application received, special
extraordinary projects, and emergencies such as strikes, natural
disasters, or extraordinary events.
3.3.2.2 Regional Operating Assistance Fund
After the $ 300,000 have been allocated to the special projects
fund, the remaining funds are broken down into two categories. The
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first category is for regional operating assistance. This, category
was established in order to put emphasis on maintaining the regional
concept. The amount of funds allocated to this category is determined
by taking 75% of the ratio of the total regional systems' expenses to
all systems' expenses, and then taking this percentage of the total
remaining funds (the total appropriation less the special projects
funds). The allocation of funds to the regional operating assistance
category is shown below.
zEE
FR = 75 ( R U s(F - S
EE. + >IE.
Where: F = the amount of funds allocated to the regional operating
assistance category
RE. the total operating expenses for system i, i 6 all regional1
systems
UEU = the total operating expenses for system i, i e all urban
systems
F = the total state transit appropriation
F5  = the amount of funds allocated to the Special Project Fund
Within the Regional Operating Assistance category, funds are
allocated to individual systems according to "locally determined income"
(LDI). The LDI for a system is defined as total system revenues, which
includes the revenue listed to Table 3.7, less state and federal
assistance. The allocation of funds to regional systems within this
category may be represented by
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Table 3.7
Locally Determined Income (LDI)
Revenue Category
Passenger Fares
Special Transit Fares
School Bus Service Revenues
Freight Tariffs
Charter Service Revenues
Auxiliary Transportation Revenues
Nontransportation Revenues
Taxes Levied Directly by Transit
System
Local Cash Grants and'Reimbursements
Local Special Fare Assistance
State Cash Grants and Reimbursements
Included
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Non-state
luui F-unds
State Special Fare Assistance Non-state
DOT Fuods
Federal Cash Grants and Reimbursements Non-US
DOT Funds
Contributed Services
LESS Contra Account for Expenses
Subsidy from Other Sectors of Operations
Not Included
State DOT
Funds
State DOT
Funds
US DOT
Funds
X
X
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LDIR
SO = ( i ) F1 ELDIR R
RWhere S = the amount of regional operating funds allocated to1
system i, i e all regional systems
LDI = the amount of locally determined income for system i,
i e all regional systems
Allocation according to LDI stresses the state's objective of encouraging
transit managers to raise as much local financial support as possible.
The Public Transit Division believes that the state should not pay for
a transit system which the locality is not willing to support .
3.3.2.3 Project Funds
The third category of funds consists of the remainder of the total
state transit appropriation after the discretionary and the regional
operating assistance has been subtracted.
F = F - FS - FR
Where F, = total project funds
This category is the Project Funding Category and is allocated to both
urban and regional systems. The total amount of project funds available
(F ) is divided between the urban and regional categories based on each
category's proportion of total statewide revenue vehicle miles.
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The allocation according to revenue vehicle miles is used to represent
the split in terms of service provided.
FR
F R
= R + -U
ZMR
( I 
EM. + EM.
EMY
FU R U
EM. + EM.
Where FR = the share of project*
systems
FU = the share of project
systems
M = the number of revenue
1
regional systems
U
M. = the number of revenue1
urban systems.
funds to be allocated to regional
funds to be allocated to urban
vehicle miles for system i, i E all
vehicle miles for system i, i c all
The project funding award to an individual system within each
of these categories is determined by a weighted sum of the system's
share of the category total of LDI, passengers/operating expense, and
revenue vehicle miles/operating expense.
LDIR R MO
=§ [ .50 ( 1) + .25 ( )O + .25 ( M]o .RLI PR R
1 50 LDI R EP EM
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LDIY PO. MOY5§ = [.50 ( ) + .25 ( -) + .25 ( )]
ELDI. EPO. EMO.
Where S. = the amount of project funds to be allocated to system i,
i c all regional systems
5§U= the amount of project funds to be allocated to system i,
i e all urban systems
POR = the ratio of passengers/operating expenses for system i,
i E all regional systems
POY = the ratio of passengers/operating expenses for system i,
i e all urban systems
MO. = the ratio of revenue vehicle miles/operating expense
1
for system i, i e all regional systems
MO1 = the ratio of revenue vehicle miles/operating expenses
for system i, i 6 all urban systems.
LDIU = the amount of locally determined income for system i, i c all
i urban systems.
The inclusion of these three factors if to reward system which:
(1) Raise a largerproportionate amount of funds locally.
(2) Are relatively more efficient than the other systems
in their category in terms of serving more passengers per
dollar of operating expense and providing more vehicle
miles of service per dollar.
In order to arrive at the total state funding awarded to an
individual system, one must sum the amount of funds the system
receives from all three funding categories (Special Projects, Regional
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Operating Assistance, and Project Funds):
F. = F. + S. + S.
F U = F + §R 1 1
Where F = the total amount of funding for i, i c all regional systems1
F = the total amount of funding for i, i c all urban systemsi
Iowa's approach to allocating state operating subsidies is still
in an introductory phase. The allocation of $300,000 to a discretionary
account provides a fund for operators who are affected adversely by
the formula allocation. However, this may decrease the effectiveness
of the incentives since a system may obtain the necessary funding
from the state regardless of its performance.
The Iowa program rewards systems which increase their local
revenues. This incentive is congruent with Iowa's goal of encoura-
ging operators to raise as much money locally as possible. However,
when it is used to compare systems it may result in the wealthiest
areas receiving more funds - contrary to their need for assistance.
The allocation of project funds to the urban and regional
categories based on revenue vehicle miles may favor the regional
category, since it is more likely to include service to areas which
are not densely populated. These areas may, in fact, have a much
higher number of revenue vehicle miles; the higher number of revenue
vehicle miles does not show the performance of the system (except
in terms of the distance the vehicles travel). This measure shows
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nothing about the effectiveness of the system in relation to the number
of passengers carried, which will probably be higher in urban areas.
3.3.3 Discussion
The category of performance-based operating subsidy allocation
programs includes performance bonuses (and penalties) in a formula
for allocating funds. Both Iowa and Pennsylvania utilize this approach
to the extent that they provide increased funding for better performance.
However, implementation of the two programs, is very different.
Pennsylvania awards a constant percentage of total state subsidy to
each system for improvement on each of four measures. The awards are
independently determined, so that improvement on a greater number of
the performance measures provides a larger total bonus. This approach
is quite interesting since it directly links a financial award with
a performance measure.
The program in Iowa is less direct in that the performance
measures are combined in a formula which compares systems. Therefore,
the amount of funding each individual system receives is based on
its relative performance. The lack of direct reward for performance
on an individual measure may not provide as strong an incentive to
improve performance as one which allocates funds in a direct relation-
ship to performance. However, this program does separate
systems into two different categories so that some similarity exists
between the systems which are being compared.
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3.4 General Conclusions About Performance-Based State Operating
Assistance Allocation
The above review of performance-based allocation-programs shows
that no two programs which have been developed are exactly alike. Those
which require a periodic performance evaluation and minimum standards
but do not allocate funds on the basis of the agencies' performance of
specified measures have the advantage of assuring that each agency
maintains a minimum level of performance in many aspects of transit
service provision. However, agencies which perform above the
minimum standards are not rewarded for their superior performance.
The only incentive to improve performance above the minimum standards
(if any exists) is the fact that the performance of the agency is
monitored.
The program developed for New Jersey, which provides bonuses
and penalties on the basis of spot checks on the level of service,
provides financial incentives for operators whose performance exells.
However, the success of such a program in improving performance is
dependent upon the acceptability of the sampling plan and the adequacy
of the sample size. If the sampling plan and sample size are properly
determined, this approach to performance-based operating assistance
allocation may prove to be more cost-effective than other approaches.
The third category of programs, those which allocate assistance
according to a performance-based formula, are similar to those which
require a periodic performance evaluation wilh minimum standards.
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The major difference between the two is the performance based formula
allocates assistance according to the results of the evaluation
(i.e. the amount of assistance awarded is determined by the score(s)
of the agency on the specified measure/s). The two states which
employ this approach administer their programs in very different
manners. In Pennsylvania each agency is awarded bonus funds solely
on the basis of the individual agency's improvement in performance
of the specified measures. In contrast, agencies in Iowa are rewarded
assistance on the basis of their performance relative to other
agencies in the state. The program in Pennsylvania has the distinct
advantage that it directly rewards each agency for improvement of
each of the specified measures independent of the performance of
other operators* and from its own performance on the other measures.
However, if the Iowa Department of Transportation could successfully
separate operators into groups of similar systems, the formula they
use to allocate assistance may be more helpful in determining an
'appropriate" score for agencies on each of the measures.
* The only exception to this statement is the use of the PA. Transit
industry expenses in constraining each operators expenses.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S PROGRAM
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines Pennsylvania's performance-based operating
assistance allocation program to determine if the program has led to
performance improvements. The Pennsylvania program will be studied to
provide insight into the effectiveness of the performance-based approach
to operating assistance allocation. This program is the most promising
to analyze for the following reasons:
(1) It was developed and supported by a broad range of transit
interest groups.
(2) It includes regular, periodic submission of data on the
performance of all systems receiving assistance.
(3) It has been in effect for two years.
(4) Financial rewards are directly attached to specific measures.
Analysis of this program may shed light on the hypothesis that
performance-based allocation can lead to improvements in the performance
of participating agencies.
The Pennsylvania program is evaluated within the broad framework of
the State's goals for both transit service in general and for funding
transit. Obviously, the program should support these goals and
(hopefully) facilitate their attainment.
Two evaluation designs are used to assess the effectiveness of
Pennsylvania's performance-based program (as defined by the stated
objectives of the program and the indicators selected). First, a
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time-series analysis of each Pennsylvania system is conducted. This
analysis involves a series of annual measurements before the performance-
based funding program was implemented and continuing measurements after
the program became effective.* The series of measurements prior to the
program and after the program help in distinguishing between trends and
possible program effects. The analysis assumes that the only new factor
affecting the operator is the program, and therefore, any changes in
performance are attributable to the program. This assumption is relayed
in the second analysis--a peer group comparison.
The peer group design compares the performance of the Pennsylvania
operators before and after implementation of the program to the
performance of a peer group of operators which have not been involved
in the program. The peer group serves as a control over factors other
than the program which may influence performance, assuming these factors
affect all operators. It helps reduce the number of plausible
explanations for changes of performance so that a better estimate of
the true program effects may be obtained.
4.2 Transit Goals in Pennsylvania
Transit goals in Pennsylvania can be separated into two inter-
related categories--(l) goals of providing transit service and (2) goals
of providing financial assistance to transit. Each of these categories
is discussed below, and the performance-based operating assistance
allocation program is evaluated in relation to each.
* Although performance-based allocation was used on an experimental
basis beginning in FY 1977/78, there was no formal adoption of the
program until FY 1980/81. Prior to FY 1980/81, allocation was made
on a discretionary basis, although performance did influence grant
determination.
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4.2.1 Goals of Providing Transit Service
The State of Pennsylvania's goals in providing transit service are
stated in Act 101 of 1980, the "Pennsylvania Urban Mass Transportation
Assistance Law":
"...the welfare and vitality of urban areas, the satisfactory
movement of people and goods, and the effectiveness of housing,
urban renewal, highway, industrial development,... are being
jeopardized by the deterioration or inadequate provision of
urban common carrier mass transportation facilities and ser-
vices, the intensification of traffic congestion and the lack
of coordinated transportation and development planning-on
a comprehensive and continuing basis...efficient and
coordinated urban common carrier mass transportation systems,
facilities, and services will promote the public health,
safety, convenience, and welfare."(')
Thus we see that the State's goals for transit are broad societal goals
of promoting the public health, safety, convenience, and welfare.
Whether or not transit enhances the welfare and vitality of
urban areas, the satisfactory movement of people and goods, and the
effectiveness of housing, urban renewal, highway and industrial
development are issues which are continuously debated. For purposes of
this thesis, we assume that transit does promote these goals and
evaluate the performance-based allocation program under this assumption.
However, not all transit services further these goals, and some are
more effective in meeting these goals than others. The distinction
between services which contribute towards these goals (and to what
-100-
degree) and those which do not can only be made at a very disaggregate
level (by route and by time of day) where characteristics of the service
and passengers are known.
As described in Chapter 3, the allocation of operating assistance
to operators in Pennsylvania is divided into two components: (1)
determination of financial need, and (2) evaluation of performance. The
financial need component is defined as a constrained portion of the non-
federal deficit. This component of a grant covers the operators'
deficits and enables. them to maintain service. However, the Pennsyl-
vania program reduces the perverse incentive of deficit based programs
to ignore increasing deficits by constraining the increase in expenses
and requiring a minimum recovery ratio. Therefore, if we agree that
transit meets the broad societal goals mentioned above, the fact that
this portion of the grant enables the provision of transit service
shows that the assistance promotes the State's goals.
The performance-related component allocates bonus funds to systems
on the basis of their scores on four measures:
(1) revenue passengers/vehicle hour (if the ratio is higher than
the previous year)
(2) operating revenue/vehicle hour (if the ratio is higher than
the previous year)
(3) operating expense/vehicle hour (if the ratio increased less
than the percentage increase in the maximum expense factor)
(4) operating revenue/operating expense (if the ratio decreased
less then 2%)
The last three measures are concerned with financial aspects of service
provision, i.e. revenue and controlling expenses. The relationship
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between the final two factcrs aind the brcad societal goals of transit
service provision is that of operating transit efficiently so that the
provision of service does not place an undue strain upon the budgets of
agencies providing assistance and hence limit the effectiveness of other
programs. Penn DOT realizes that.transit operating expenses are bound
to increase from year to year due to inflation, but they attempt to
limit each operator's percentage increase to the aggregate increase of
the Pennsylvania transit industry. They also allow for inflation by
allowing the revenue/expense ratio to decrease by a limited amount (2%).
The second measure (operating revenue/vehicle hour) may be viewed
from two perspectives. The first is that it helps to promote the wel-
fare of society by limiting the dependence of transit operators upon
external sources of funding and thus causes less strain on the various
levels of government. An alternative viewpoint is that it places an
undue burden on the users by requiring them to contribute to the costs
of service provision.
Given that transit use is in the public interest, the first
measure promotes the state's transit goals since it rewards increases in
transit patronage. Taken together, the bonuses reward agencies which
increase patronage and revenues and control expenses. However,
operators may also qualify for the bonuses by eliminating low revenue
or low ridership routes even though these routes serve the needs of the
transportation disadvantaged.
Therefore, it is important to monitor the individual components of
each measure as well as the measure itself to understand the cause of the
change in performance. This understanding may be achieved by looking at
the individual components of each performance measure or the actions
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taken to create the change to see if the cause of the improvement in
the overall measure is desirable (:g., the ratio of revenue passengers/
vehicle hour may be improved by reducing the number of passengers less
than the vehicle hours by eliminating the lowest ridership routes. This
may not necessarily be a desirable change.) Thus whether or not the
performance bonuses promote the state's goals for transit depends upon
acceptance of the assumption that transit promotes broad societal goals
and whether the actions taken to "improve" performance are desirable.
4.2.2 Goals of Funding Transit
The Pennsylvania Mass Transit Assistance program, defined in Act
101, grants the authority:
"...to make project grants to any transportation company to
supplement Federal, private, or local, or Federal and private
or local funds for use in financing purchase of service
projects...and...to assist in financing purchase of service
projects designed to continue necessary service to the public
and to permit service which may be socially desirable but
economically unjustified.. .no State grant shall be made for a
particular purchase of service project unless the department
determines and finds for said project that:
(A) the purchase of service project is necessary in the
public interest
(B) the mass transportation carrier is taking or will
take continuing action to improve the service and
hold losses to a minimum."(2)
These goals are congruent with the State's general goals for transit.
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The State has identified seven immediate objectives in order to achieve
these goals: (3)
(1) maintain existing transit services
(2) increase the network coverage, capacity and frequency of
transit services
(3) improve the quality of service
(4) stabilize or reduce transit fares*
(5) stimulate the use of transit services and facilities
(6) modernize operating practices and reduce operating costs
(7) encourage the development of working relationships between
transit agencies and other transportation authorities.
The financial need portion of the grant is directly supportive of
Pennsylvania's goals for transit assistance as stated in Act 101. More
specifically, this portion of the grant meets the objectives of
maintaining existing transit services, and it may allow a stabilization
of or a reduction of transit fares by financing service which cannot be
supported by the current (or a lower) fare:
The bonus incentive provided for increasing revenue passengers/
vehicle hour supports the objective of stimulating the use of transit
services and facilities if the increase of the measure is attained by
increasing the number of revenue passengers while maintaining the same
service (vehicle hours) or by increasing the amount of service at a
lower rate than the increase in revenue passengers. However, if this
measure is increased by eliminating the lowest ridership routes, the
change is not consistent with the objective.
* This statement has since been qualified to allow reasonable fare
increases to keep up with inflation but to maintain lower fares for
the elderly.
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Improvement of the operating revenue/vehicle hour measure is
supportive of the objective of maintaining existing transit services
since it increases the financial viability of the transit operation. If
the increase in revenue/vehicle hour is greater than the increase in
expenses/vehicle hour, the increase in revenues may promote the goals
of increasing coverage, capacity and frequency, improving the quality of
service, and modernizing operating practices. However, the incentive to
increase the operating revenue/vehicle hour may lead the operator to
increase fares which would be contrary to objective four--stabilizing or
reducing transit fares.
Any attempt to control operating expenses/vehicle hour.is consis-
tent with the second part of objective six--reduce operating costs.
Moreover, a reduction in operating expenses, if accomplished without
eliminating necessary or desirable services, can help to maintain
existing transit services and help stabilize fares. If savings result,
these savings may be used to increase the coverage, capacity, and
frequency of services or to improve the quality of service.
Similarly, attempts to control the decline of the operating
revenue/operating expense ratio are attempts to control expenses and
increase revenues. Therefore, changes in this measure will have similar
effects as those which occur from changes in the operating revenue/
vehicle hour and operating expense/vehicle hour measures.
Thus we see that the ability of the performance incentives to
support the state's goals of providing assistance depends on the actions
the operator takes to "improve" performance. In determining whether
or not the iir.provement of a particular measure means attainment of
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state goals, we would have to analyze both components of each measure
and other service factors such as frequencies, fares, and vehicle loads.
We also see that while one measure may be supportive of one objective,
it may be contrary to other objectives, so tradeoffs must be made.
The remainder of this chapter presents 'analyses of the performance
of the Pennsylvania operators on each of the specified measures.
4.3 Statistical Analysis
The statistical analysis is conducted to determine if the perfor-
mance of the operators on the selected measures has improved since
implementation of the program and if the changes made to improve
performance are consistent with the state's objectives. In developing
an analysis approach, one must consider the data which are available.
4.3.1 Data
Data were obtained from the Pennsylvania Mass Transit Statistical
Reports, which are published annually. -These reports are based on
information collected through the Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion's annual transit questionnaire and applications for state operating
assistance. Although data are available from FY 1973-74 to FY 1981-82,
only the data from FY 1976-77 on are used because the fiscal year was
different prior to that year. (The state fiscal year now runs from
July 1 through June 30.) The data includes the values of each of the
variables used in the performance measures as defined below: (4
Transit Operating Expenses - The total amount of eligible transit
operating expenses incurred by a transit authority through its (1)
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scheduled public transit operations including eligible fixed route and
demand responsive service, and (2) its non-scheduled service such as
charter and school contract service. The cost of scheduled and non-
scheduled services are to be reported separately either through the
direct determination of thEse expenses or an indirect allocation of
these costs such as determining the percentage of total vehicle miles
dedicated to these special services and then allocating the same per-
centage of total operating expenses for this non-scheduled service.
For example, if 10% of total vehicle miles are due to the provision of
these special services, then 10% cf total operating expenses would be
allocated to non-scheduled service.
Transit Operating Revenue - The total arount of eligible operating
revenue received by a transit authority through its (1) demand responsivo
service and (2) its non--scheduled service such as charter and school
contract service. The revenues received for non-scheduled services are
expected to cover operating expenses for non-scheduled services and must
be reported separately.
Revenue Passengers-The number of originating passengers, including
senior citizens and demand responsive users that ride public transit
service. This figure excludes all transfer, charter, school contract,
and other users of non-scheduled service.
Vehicles Hours - The number of vehicle hours of scheduled service
provided by a transit authority. This figure includes all scheduled
fixed route and eligible demand responsive public transit service but
excludes charter and school contract service.
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Penn DOT requires that the data be collected in the same manner from
year to year or that the operator informs them of any changes in data
collection techniques. The systems for which data are available and
their respective service areas are listed in Table 4.1.
Throughout tha analysis, inconsistencies were found between this
data and the performance bonuses granted. Thus more information was
requested from Penn DOT. The new information contained the data used
by the Bureau of Public Transit and Goods Movement to calculate the
1982-83 and 1983-84 operating assistance grants. This data includes
1979-80, 1980-81, ird 1981-82 statistics.
This new data set also contained inconsistencies. Since the
1980-81 data is used to determine -both the 1982-83 and 1983-84 grants,
data for this year appeared twice in the information obtained. However,
the two sets of data for this year still contained many inconsistencies.
Thus the analysis was conducted using four years of data (1975-76
through 1981-82) from the annual statistical reports, the 1979-80
data used to calculate the 1982-83 grants, and the 1980-81 and 1981-82
data used to calculate the 1983-84 grants. This data is presented in
Appendix C. The analysis was also conducted using the data from the
statistical reports for all seven years and is included in Appendix D.
Although seven years of data are available for most of the
Pennsylvania operators, only two years of data are available after
official implementation of the program. Therefore, it is difficult to
draw conclusions from analyses of the individual operators. One way to
overcome this problem is to combine data from all the operators to
create a new data base which consists of pooled time-series and
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TABLE 4.1
LIST OF PA SYSTEMS
Agency Name Service Area
LARGE URBANIZED AREAS
PAT Port Authority of Allegheny Pittsburgh
County
SEPTA Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans- Philadelphia
portation Authority
OTHER URBANIZED AREAS
ALTOONA Altoona Motor Duses fcr
Public Use Authority
BARTA Berks Area Reading
Transportation Authority
Altoona
Reading
Cumberland, Dauphin,
Harrisburg Transit Authority
Cambria County Transit
Authority
County of Lackawanna
Transit System
Erie Metropolitan Transit
Authority
Lehigh and Northampton
Transportation Authority
Luzerne County Trans-
portation Authority
Red Rose Transit Authority
Williamsport Bureau of
Transportati on
York Area Transportation
Authority
Harrisburg
Johnstown
Scranton
Erie
Allentown
Wilkes-Barre
Lancaster
Williamsport
York
SMALL CARRIERS:
ALIQUIPPA
COLONIAL
FRONTIER
POTTSTOWN
REEDERS
T-P COACH
URBANIZED AREAS
Greater Aliquippa Transit
Colonial Coach Corp.
Frontier Div. - SEPTA
Pottstown Transit Co.
Reeder's Inc.
Trenton-Philadelphia Coach
Alquippa
Lower Bucks Co.
Norristown
Pottstown
Chester Co.
Lower Bucks Co.
System
CAT
CCTA
COLTS
EMTA
LANTA
L CTA
RRTA
WMSPT
YATA
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cross-sectional data. This data base has more information to facilitate
a statistical evaluation of the effects of the program.*
A statistical procedure for determining the program effects could
be undertaken with the following steps:
(1) Model Specification
define a model y = f(x, y) + Eit
where y is the dependent variable (the performance measure)
x is the vector of explanatory variables (e.g.
system size, fare, local terrain, age of vehicle,
etc.)
one of the explanatory variables is a dummy variable,
D it
where
1 if the program has been implemented for
Dit = system i in the year t
0 otherwise
x is the vector of unknown coefficients
Eit is the error term.
(2) Determine the vector of coefficients x with the pooled data
using least squares estimation.
(3) Find the t-statistic to determine if the coefficient of the
dummy variable is significantly different from zero.
(4) If the dummy variable is significantly different from zero,
it is possible that the program had an effect.
However, such an analysis is outside the scope of this thesis since
* For estimation of models with pooled cross-section and time-series
data, see Kmenta, Jan, Elements of Econometrics, pp. 508-517.
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specification of a causal model requires extensive empirical analysis
which the amount and quality of the available data did not warrant.
Therefore, a time--series analysis is employed.
4.3.2 Time-Series Analysis
The time-series analysis is conducted to determine if the
performance of the operators as reflected in the various measures
follows the trend which existed prior to implementation of the program.
The time series model used predicts future performance solely on the
basis of past performance; it accounts for patterns in the past move-
ments of a particular variable and uses that information to predict
future movements of the variable.. The various performance measures are
recorded over seven years (FY 1975/76--FY 1981/82): five prior to the
program (the program was still discretionary although performance was
considered) and two after implementation. The program was officially
implemented in FY 1980/81. Due to the requirement that performance
bonus grants be awarded on the basis of actual (rather than predicted)
performance, the grant lags actual performance by two years. The
grants awarded in both FY 1980/81 and FY 1981/82 were based on the
changes in performance from FY 1978/79 to FY 1979/80. However,
operators knew (in FY 1980/81) that their performance would influence
future grants.
The five years of data prior to implementation of the program help
to control for the influence of factors (maturation effects or trends)
other than the program which may confound interpretation of the
results. Thus the time series model projects the pre-program trend to
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post program years to predict what performance would be without tne
program. Assuming that no other new factors have influenced performance,
the differences between the projected values and the actual values may
be attributed to the proqram. Ideally, we would cnoose to use more pre-
program data to increase the accuracy of the estimation of the parameters
and to allow the use of causal independent variables.
The analysis was conducted as follows:
(1) Specify a linear trend time-series model
Yt 0 + a t
where Y t is the value of the performance measure in year t
t is the data year
a is the vectorof unknown coefficients
Such a model is developed for each system, for each measure.
(2) Use pre-program data to determine the coefficients, using
least squares estimation. The coefficient a I represents tne
average change in tne performance measure from year to year
for the five pre-program years. This value also represents
tne expected cnange in performance for the following years,
given no changes which affect performance.
(3) Calculate the actual change in performance from Year 5 to 6
and Year 6 to 7. Calculate the difference between the pre-
dicted change and the actual change to determine if a signifi-
cant change in performance has occurred.
In order to reduce the computational effort, this analysis was con-
ducted for a representative subset of seven Pennsylvania operators.
The results of the analysis are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
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TABLE 4.2 CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
SYSTEM Rev Pass/Veh Hr
Average Change
Pre-program Year
Change 5-6
Change
Year
6-7
-0.8 -1.9 -0.4PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
2.1
1.0
-4.5 -0.2
0.1 -1.7
3.1 -0.8 -2.8
1.2 -1.9CAT
COLTS
LANTA
POTTSTOWN
1.0
0.6
-1.6 -1.6
2.4 -1.7
1.7 -1.3
0.5
1.1
Op Exp/Veh Hr
Average Change
Pre-program Year
Change 5-6
1.5 4.8
5.4 6.9
2.7
1.8
1.2
2.1
2.4
1.6
Change
Year
6-7
9.1
3.7
3.0 -0.1
3.2
3.5
5..5
2.3
2.5
0.8
3.4- 2.0
3.5.. 2.8
TABLE 4.2 cont'd
SYSTEM Rev Pass/Veh Hr
Average Change
Pre-program Year
Change 5-6
PAT 0.4
2.8
0.4
0.7
0.3
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
COLTS
LANTA
4.1
6.5
1.9
3.1
1.1
0 2.1
0.9 2.0
Change
Year
6-7
3.8
3.0
0.7
2.2
0.9
0.8
0.9
Op Exp/Veh . r
Average Change
Pre-program Year
Change 5-6-
-0.01
Change
Year
6-7
0.05 -0.02
0 . 0.06
-0.04
-0.01
-0.02
-0.05
-0.01
-0.01
0.03 0.03
0.05 0.03
-0.02 -0.02
0 0.01
0.02 0.01
-0.02 -0.01 0.05POTTSTOWN 0.5 1.2 2.3
TABLE 4.3 RELATIVE CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
SYSTEM Rev Pass/Veh Hr Op Eky/Veh Hr Op Rev/Veh Hr
Year 5-6 Year 6-7 Year 5-6 Year 6-7 Year 5-6 Year 6-7
PAT - + - - + +
SEPTA - + - + + +
AMTRAN - - - + + +
BARTA - - - - + +
CAT - - - - + +
COLTS - - - + + +
LANTA - - - + + +
POTTSTOWN - - - - + +
Rev/Exp
Year 5-6 Year 6-7
+-
+-
+ +
+ +
~ ~~
+ +
+ +
+ +
U)
I
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Table 4.2 shows the average pre-program change for eacn of the oper-
ators on each of the four measures, as well as the observed cnanges
for each of the post-program years. Table 4.3 shows for each operator
the change in each measure compared with the predicted change. A "+"
appears if the operator performed better than expected, a "-"
appears if the operator pertormed worse than expected, and a "~" appears
if the operator performs as expected.
Table 4.3 shows that the operators scorea better than expected on
the operating revenue/ vehicle nour and revenue/ expense measures for
both years, and consistently scored worse on the revenue passenger/
vehicle hour measure for both years and the operating expense/ vehicle
hour for the first year. Tnus, it is possible that the program had an
effect on the systems' performance.
Two nonparametric statistical tests are applicable to testing
whether the observed relative improvements of the Pennsylvania operators
are simply due to randomness: (1) the Sign Test and (2) tne Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Test. The second test was employed since it considers not
only direction, but also tne magnitude of the difference between the
paired observations. Tne test is conducted in the following steps:
(1) The null hypothesis to be tested is
H 0 : y1- y2 = 0
(2) The alternative hypotnesis is
H 1 : p 1- y2 < 0 for expense/ venicle hour and p 1- P2> 0 otherwise.
(3) Rank the differences, di, according to magnitude, disregarding
their algebraic signs. Let r1 be the rank of IdI|.
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Let Z be defined as
Z= 0 if d. < 0
1 1
Z- = 1 if d. > 0
1 1
(4) Calculate the Wilcoxon Statistic
n
w = zZ r
i=1
(5) The cri tical region (for rejecting the null hypothesis) is
defined by a critical value W given in tables for twelve or
less observations and by approximating the distribution by the
normal distribution for > 12 observations.
(6) Reject the null hypothesis if
W > W for pass../ veh. hr., rev./ veh. hr., and rev./ exp.
W < W for exp./ veh..hr.
This test was conaucted for each of the four measures.
The results of the Wilcoxon Test support the intuitive results
tnat the operators' performance is better tnan predicted for the operating
revenue/ vehicle nour and the revenue/expense measures for both post-
program years. The results of the Wilcoxon Test snow that with 95%
confidence the better performance of tne two measures for both post-
program years is not a random event. The number of operators performing
better on the passenger/vehicle hour and expense/vehicle hour measures
and the magnitude of the differences are insignificant for both years.
Thus, the Wiicoxon Test demonstrated tnat witn 95% confidence there was
no improvement in performance along these dimensions.
It is interesting to note that the performance of the operators on
pass./veh. hr. and exp./veh. hr. measures was consistently worse than
predicted, had no program been introduced. This suggests that either
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some other factor is affecting the performance of tnese measures or that
the program is imposing a-negative effect on these measures. For example,
it is possible that the operators raised their tares in a successful at-
tempt to increase their rev./exp. and rev./veh. hr. measures, Dut this
caused a decrease in ridership. In fact, all eight operators increased
their fares in FY 1980/81 and 62.5% raised their fares in FY1981/82.
The increased fares may or may not have been caused by tne introduction
or the program, however, they probably caused some decline in ridership.
Deterioration in the exp./veh. hr. measure was probably due to higher
inflation nationally in these two years than the average over the pre-
ceding tive years--completely unrelated to the program effects. Thus,
a major shortcoming of the time series analysis is its inability to
detect changes in pertormance wich occur because of factors external to
the program.
Although the time series analysis showed better perfromance of the
rev./exp. and rev./veh. hr. measures, one cannot be sure that their
improvements occured in response to the program. Likewise, the pass./
veh.hr. ana exp./veh. hr. measures were worse, but we do not Know the
role the program playea in these aspects of performance. The following
section presents an anaysis which attempts to control tor those factors
external to the program which may affect pertormance so that changes in
performance may be attributed to the program.
4.4 Peer Group Comparison
The time series anaiysis assumed that the only new factor aftecting
performance is the program and thus, any cnanges in performance are at-
tributable to the program. However, this assumption is very naive ana
-117-
will be relaxed in this analysis. The peer group analysis determines if
tne performance of the Pennsylvania systems follows tne trend or nas
improved relative to similar systems which do not operate under the
program. The peer group systems are used to provide a control over fac-
tors other than the program which may affect performance.
4.4.1 Data
A second data set was drawn from the Niational Urban Mass Trans-
portation Statistics Section 15 Reports (Years 1-3, representing FY 1978/
79, 79/80, and 80/81). This data consists of the following measures for
transit systems nationwide:
operating revenue (transportation)--(obtained from Table 002.01.1)
total operating expenses--(obtained from Table 002.08.1)
unlinked passenger trips--(obtained from Table 00 .17.2)
vehicle hours--(obtained from Table 002.17.1)
This data set is limited to the two years prior to implementation of the
performance- based allocation program and one year following implemen-
tation. Section 15 data is available for only thirteen or the Pennsyl-
vania operators, so the analysis is limited to these tnirteen systems.
The peer group comparison is an attempt to controi for the factors
other than the program which may influence performance by comparing the
series of data for each agency served by the-program to that of similar
agencies not served by the program. If the other agencies show changes
in performance similar to the Pennsylvania operators', then the changes
The variaole unlinked passenger trips is used as a proxy tor revenue
passengers since the latter is-not contained in the Section 15 data.
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in pertormance are probably caused by factors external to tne program.
The peer groups were formed in the following steps:
(1) Tne Pennsylvania operators were stratitied irto five groups,
based on urban area population and number of venicies.
(2) Peer operators were selected for each of tne five groups,
based on urban area pcpulation, number of vehicles, and geo-
graphic characteristics.
(3) Peer groups were further retined on the basis of urban area
population density, SMSA population density, and a rough
estimate of transit worK trips.
The various peer groups and tne stratification variables are shown in
Tables 4.4 A-E.
4.4.2 Analysis
The analysis compares the cnanges in performance of each of tne
Pcnnsylvania operators from year to year to tne average' peer group change.
The average values of the peer group are used (as opposed to comparisons
witn individual operators) to provide a better control over difterences
in operating environments.
. The values of each of the performance measures for each system ior
the three years are shown in Tables 4.5 A-E. Due to the obvious errors
in some data, some measures were excluded from the analysis for certain
operators, as shown in the tables.
In order to determine whether or not tne program nas affected per-
torinance, the percentage increase (or decrease) of a given measure for
each of tne Pennsylvania systems is compared to the mean change for its
peer group. The percentage cnange in perrormance o eacn of the Pennsyl-
TABLE 4.4 A PEER QROUP STRATIFICATION
Urban Area
Population
(000)
Urban Area 2
Pop. Density
SMSA Pop. 3
Density
No. of
Buses
Workers
during
Census wk.
used Pub.
Tranp. to
work %
Labor
Force
4(000)
No. of workers
taking Public
Tranp. to
work
EMTA Erie, PA
CCTA Johnstown,PA
COLTS Scranton,PA
BARTA ReadingPA
LCTA Wilkes Barre,PA
LANTA AllentownPA
RRTA Lancaster,PA
Greater Portland
Transit, Portland ME 1
Central Arkansas Trans.
Little Rock, AR 2
Greater Peoria MTD
Peoria, IL 2
Springfield MTD.
Springfield IL 1
South Bend PTC 2
175
96
204
168
223
364
117
3,480
2,684
1,035
3,207
1,132
2,862
2,233
1,698
1,356
2,003
2,579
3,073
07
23
47
21
89
331
149
511
354
380
576
371
989
253
200
210
309
69
35
36
49
55
65
32
63
67
45
42
58
5.0
8.4
11.5
7.2
4.4
5.2
8.3
5.1
3.5
5.1
3.5
67 3,345
82
75
90
154
50
6,850
8,626
6,502
6,776
2,586
43 3,571
90 4,578
99 3,452
52
116
2,668
4,056
Greater Roanoke Tr
Roanoke, VA 1,749 696 38 7.4
SYSTEM
I
157 65 4,843
TABLE 4.4 B PEER GROUP STRATIFICATION
Urban Area1  Urban Area2
Population Pop- Density
(000)
SMSA Pop.3 No. of
Density Buses
Workers
during
Census wk.
used Pub.
Tranp. to
work %
CAT Harrisburg,
PA
DART Wilmington,
DE
Des Moines MTA
Des Moines ,IA
Al bany- Capi tal
DTA Albany ,NY
SYSTEM Labor
Force4
(000)4
241
371
256
487
No. of
taking
Tranp.
work
workers
Public
to
1 ,753
2,168
2,107
2,454
265
442
562
357
81
100
100
236
7.3
5.9
5.2
10.2
102
146
110
198
7,411
8,593
5,705
20,159
CD
TABLE 4.4 C PEER GROUP STRATIFICATION
Urban Area1
Population
(000)
Urban Area2
Pop. Density
SMSA Pop.3
Density
No. ofl
buses
Workers
during
Census wk.
used Pub.
Transp. to
work %
Labor
Force(000)4
No. of workers
taking Public
transp. to
work
AMTRAN Altoona
PA
WMSPT Williamsport
PA
Wilmington TA
Wilmington, NC
Greater Lynchburg
Transit Lynchburg
VA
Kenosho Transit
Kenosho, WI
82
63
58
2,999
2,766
748
79771
84
253
a
125
144
31
16
19
27
5,8
5.2
9.8
3,858 454 28 2.3
30
23
28
1 ,732
1 ,178
2,774
SYSTEM
32 745
I
TABLE 4.4 D PEER GROUP STRATIFICATION
No. of RRT' SC' Trolley' DR' Other
Buses
Wrks. Labor
during Force
Cns.wk. (000)4
used
Pub.Trnsp.
to wrk. %
No. of wrks.
taking Pub.
Trnsp. to
work
SEPTA
Philadelphia
PA
WMATA
Washington
D.C.
4,021 3,963
2,481 3,075
CTA Chicago
IL. 6,715 4,483
1,343 1,552 488 320 112 - - 24.4
18.31,283 2,154 296
1,890 2,400 1,100
1,579 385,157
1,048 192,728
24.4 2,733 666,783
SYSTEM Urbag
Area
Pop.
Urban
Area 2
Pop.
Density
SMSA
Pop3
Density
TABLE 4.4 E PEER GROUP STRATIFICATION
No. of RRT1
Buses
SC Trolley DR Other Wrks.
during
Cns.wk.
used
Pub. Trnsp.
to wrk. %
Labor
Force
(000)4
No. of
wrks.taking
Pub. Trnsp.
to work
PAT
Pittsburg,
PA 1,846 2,588 747 937 9 95 2 17.7 680 120,374
Grtr. Cleve-
land RTA
Cleveland
OH
Milwaukee
Cty. TS
Milwaukee,
WI
1,960 3,117
1,252 2,524
1 ,276
973
888 116 66
597
49 14
13.3
789 110,425
514 68,399
17.5 635 111,142
SYSTEM Urban
Areal
Pop.
(000)
Urba
Area
Pop.
Density
SMSA
Pop.
Density
Baltimore
MTA
Bal timore
MD
I
F__A
1,580 3,022 949 1,029
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FOOTNOTES--TABLES 4.4 A-E
As defined in National Urban Mass Transportation Statistics:
First Annual Report, Section 15 Reporting System, USDOT, TSC, Cambridge,
1981 (Reprint). (Derived from 1970 US Census Data.
2Derived using Urban Area Population Data (as described above) and
Urban Land Areas (also derived from US Census Data).
3Derived from SMSA Population and SMSA Area data, obtained from
the 1970 data in the County and City Data Book (1972).
4
County and City Data Book (1972) .
aData unavailable.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES -- PEER GROUP COMPARISON
SYSTEM Revenue/Expense
(%)
Expense/Vehicle
Hour
Revenue/Vehicle
Hour
Unlinked Passengers
Vehicle Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3 Yearl Year2 Year3 Yearl
34.4 37.2 35.0 16.9 23.1 25.2 5.8
35.4 34.2 33.8 19.6 22.9 32.1 7-.0
38.0 31.3 26.6 18.6 24.3 29.2 7.1
36.2 46.1 54.0 22.O 19.8 23.2 8.0
42.2 40.0 34.0 18.0 20.7 27.0 7.6
33.0 34.6 34.2 20.5 25.0 28.0 7.0
33.2 37.2 38.r 15.7 19.9 22.9 5.2
EMTA
CCTA
COLTS
BARTA
LCTA
LANTA
RRTA
Greater
Portland
Central
Arkansas
Greater
Peoria
Spring-
field
51.0 46.8 20.9 21.5 22.7 7.9
31.1 35.3 16.8 17.7 20.1 5.5
24.3 29.3 31.0 21.8 28.8 30.1 5.3
23.1 21.9 19.6 22.9. 28.3 31.9 5.3
Southbend 24.7 24.3 21.3 24.8 26.0 29,7 6.1
Year2
8.6
Year3
8.8
7.8 10.9
Yearl Year2
22.9 44.1
Year3
40.8
-erroneous data
7.6 7.8 27.8 36.4 44.8-
9.1 12.5 36.1 34.6 31.2 a
9.7 9.2 29.3 36.7 43.3
8.7 9.6 29.6 36.1 37.9
7.4 8.8 24.5 30.7 30.6
11.0 10.6 31.0 30.9 28.7
5.5 7.1 22.2 18.8 25.3
8.4 9.3 "21.3 22.9 18.9
6.2 6.3 35.3 41.2 41.7
6.3 6.3 27.1 27.2 28.4
36.9' 34.4
30.0. 32.0
35.0
31.5
14.8 16.9 20.2
20-.3 23.2 26.0
5.5
5.9
5.8 7.0 16.7
7.2 7. 25.7
37.9
33.0
i-h
LI
Greater
Roanoke 22.5
27. 2
22.0
27. 5
TABLE 4.5 A
TABLE 4.5 B PERFORMANCE MEASURES -- PEER GROUP COMPARISCH
SYSTEM Revenue/Expense
(%)
Yearl Year2 Year3
Expense Vehicle
Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3
Revenue/Vehicle
Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3,
Unlinked Passenger
Vehicle Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3
39.2 39.4 39.4
40.0 44. 7 38.9
45.8 52.3 42.4
50.0 44.8 48.1
45.2 47.3 43.1
22.5 26.4 29.7 8.8
27.3 30.5 34.4 10.9
20.7 25.3 32.5 9.5
19.6 23.8 26.8 9.8
22,6 26.5 31,2 1071
10.4 11.7 45.7 49.5 erroneous
13.6 13.4 39.2 39.6 35.0
13.2 13.8 15.4 28.4 30.3
10.7 12.9 30.0 31.7 31.7
12.5 13,4 28.2 33,2 28.8
CAT
DART
Des-
Moines
Albany-
Capital
C7**,
1
TABLE 4.5 C
SYSTEM Revenue/Expense
(%)
PERFORMANCE MEASURES -- PEER GROUP COMPARISON
Expense/Vehicle
Hour
Revenue/Vehicle
Hour
Unlinked Passengers/
Vehicle Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3 Yearl Year2 Year3 Yearl Year2 Year3- Yearl Year2 Year3
15.6 18.0 19.9 34.5 26.3 26.5.
26.5 25.7 29.0 17.4 19.9 21.5
36.4 34.0 31.8 14.3 18.1 21.1
38.9 39.6 35.9 16.5 18.5 21.8
30.7 32.7 22.3 12.7 16.0 18.8
5.4
4.6
5.2
6.4
3.9
4.7 5.3 42.7 27.7 26.6
5.1 6.2 24.1 27.1 29.1
6.2 6.7 21.4 35.4 36.8
7.3 7.8 30.1 30.2 26.8
5.2 4.2 8.9 9.8
14.6 17.5 19.8 5.2 6.3 5.9 20.3 23.5
AMTRAN
WMSPT
Wilming-
ton
Greater
Lynchburg
Kenosha
I
6.6
35.3 36.1, 29.9 19.9
TABLE 4.5 D PERFORMANCE MEASURES -- PEER GROUP COMPARISON
Revenue/Expense
(%)
Yearl Year2 Year3
Expense/Vehicle
Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3
50.4 36.2 49.5 36 .0 50.1 41.7 18.1
45.4 44.8 46.1 40.4 45.5 55.6 ' 18.4
Revenue/Vehicle
Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3
Unlinked Passengers/
Vehicle Hour
Yearl Year2
18.1 20.7 71.2 70.6
20.4 25.6 53.5 56.3
Year3
71.8
57.3
52.4 45.1 411.5 40.8 46.2 57.6 21.4 20.8 24.2 78.1 76.9 78.2
48 .9 44.9 44.0 40.6 45 .9 56 .6 19..9 ?0..6 24 .9 65 .8 66.6
SYSTEM
SEPTA
WMATA
CTA
67.8
I
00I
PERFORMANCE MEASURES -- PEER GROUP COMPARISON
Revenue/Expense
(%)
Expense/Vehicle
Hour
Revenue/Vehicle
Hour
Unlinked Passengers/
Vehicle Hour
Yearl Year2 Year3
39.2 39.7 43.3
Yearl Year2 Year3 Yearl Year2 Year3 Yearl Year2
32.0 35.9 39.9
25.4 23.1 24.6 36.8 40.1 45.6
57.8 54.6 46.9 19.7 21.6 27.9 11.4
51.3 44.6 47.9 26.9 35.3 39.1
44.9 40.7 39.8 27.8 32.4 37.5
12.5 14.2 17.4. 40.3 39.7
9.4 9.3 11.2 59.9 55.8
11.9 13.1 51.3 46.8 49.0
13.8 15.7 18.7 47.6 54.4
12.3 14.4 52.9 52.3 52.2
SYSTEM
PAT
Greater
Cleveland
Milwaukee
City
Baltimore
Year3
38.5
56.9
t'Q
51.7
TABLE 4.5 E
11.5
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vania operators and tne mean percentage charge for their peer groups
are shown in Table 4.6. The differences between each of tne Pennsyl-
vania systems and its peer group were calculated for eacn measure to
determine if the Pennsylvania system performed better (increased the
rev./ exp., rev./veh. hr., or pass./veh. hr. measures more or decreased
them less or decreased tne exp./veh. hr. measure more or increased it
less) than its peer group counterpart after implementation of the pro-
gram (Year 2-3). Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the relative changes in per-
formance for eacn of the Pennsylvania operators for both the pre-program
data and the post-program data. If the Pennsylvania operator performed
better relative to its peer group counterpart, a +" appears; if the
Pennsylvania operator scored worse, a "-" appears.
Two perspectives are taKen to interpret the data in TaDles 4.7 and
4.8. The first considers the number of operators wnicn show greater
improvement on each or the specified measures. The Wilcoxon Signed
Rank Test was applied to the data. The secona examines the numDer of
systems (1-13) wnicn score Detter on a specific number (0-4) of tne
measures.
Nine of tne Pennsylvania operators exhiDited better relative per-
formance on the re_./exp. ratio than the peer group mean (ie., a larger
relative increase or a smaller decrease). Eight of tne operators actually
increased the rev./exp. ratio. The Wilcoxon Test shows that with 95%
confidence the improvement of performance is not a random event.
Seven of the Pennsylvania operators either increased the exp./veh.
hr. measure at a lower rate than the peer group means or actually de-
creased it. The Wilcoxon Test shows that tne null hypothesis cannot be
TABLE 4.6 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
Revenue/Exnense
%A1- 2 %A2-3
8 -6
SYSTEM
EMTA
CCTA
COLTS
BARTA
LCTA
LANTA
RRTA
5
12
6
-1
3
-1.5
Expense/Veh Hr
%A 1- 2 %A2-3
36
17
31
-10
15
22
27
14
9
40
20
17
30
12
15
11.5
Revenue/Veh Hr
"Al-2
47
11
8
15
27
24
42
20.7
*A 2-3
3
38
2
37
-5
11
19
9.9
Passen gers /'Veh Hr
93 -3
erroneous data
31
-4
25
22
25
7.3
23
-10
18
5
0
2
U~)
CAT 0.51 0.05 17 12 18 13 erroneous data
5 -8 18 18 25 8 erroneous data
AMTRAN 15 11 -24 0.53 -12 11 -35 -4
WMSPT -3 13 14 8 11 22 12 7
0.7 -16 22 17 17 -1 -13
SEPTA -28 37 39 -17 -0.05 14 -l 2
-7.5 2 13 24 4 21 2 2
PAT 1 10 12 11 14 22 -2
18 6 1.7 -1,
-3 -1
-18 -15
27 17
-5 -15
1-9. 3 0 17
-132-
TABLE 4.7 RELATIVE CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
YR.1 - YR.2
Change Relative to Peer Group
Revenue/Expense Expense/Veh. Revenue/Veh. Passengers/Veh.
Hour Hour Hour
+ -+ +
- - -a
- - -+
+
+
SYSTEM
EMTA
CCTA
COLTS
BARTA
LCTA
LANTA
RRTA
CAT
AMTRAN
.!MSPT
SEPTA
PAT +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
a+
+
+
+ +
+ = Better change in performance relative to peer group mean.
- = Worse change in performance relative to peer group mean.
aComparison not possible due to erroneous data.
+
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TABLE 4.8 RELATIVE CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
YR. 2 - YR. 3
Change Relative to Peer Group
Revenue/Expense Expense/Veh. Revenue/Veh.
Hour Hour
- +4-
+ -+
+ + +
-+ --
+ - +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + -
+ + +
Passenger/
Veh. Hour
a
+
--
--
a
+
+
+ = Better change in performance relative to peer group mean.
- = Worse change in performance relative to peer group mean.
a Comparison not possible due to erroneous data.
SYSTEM
EMTA
CCTA
COLTS
BARTA
LCTA
LANTA
RRTA
CAT
AMT RAN
NISPT
SEPTA
PAT
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rejected and that with 95% contidence the better performance of tne
exp./ven. hr. measure tor some operators could be due to randomness.
Eight of the Pennsylvania operators had better performarce on the
rev./veh. hr. measure than the peer group mean. However, the wilcoxon
Test, prevents rejection of tne null hypothesis at tne 95% contidence
level and thus with 95% proDability tne improvements ot performance are
*
random.
Half of the operators performea better on the pass./veh. hr. measure
than their peer group counterparts. As expected, the Wi icoxcn Test snows
that with 95% confidence the improvements of performance are random.
This analysis shows that the rev./exp. measure may have improved as
a result of tne program. However, improvement of tnis measure does
not necessarily imply attainment of the state's goals. As was mentioned
previously, attainment of the state's goals can only be evaiuated if
one knows the actions taken to create changes in pertormance and 1tne
impacts of tnese actions on all aspects of service. The measures. may
be improved, but the actions taken to improve the measures may De con-
trary to the state's goals.
The rev./exp,. ratio may be improved by eliminating the less traveled
routes or by reducing frequencies on these routes kthereby reducing
expenses more than revenues) which may be contrary to the state's goal
of maintaining service. Thus we can look at tne change in venicle hours
to determine if service has been cut. Only three or the Pennsylvania
operators reauced tneir vehicle hours--SEPTA, COLTS, and LCTA, However,
Tne null hypothesis may be rejected at the 85% confiaence level, and
tnus, with 85% contidence the improverents of this measure are not
aue to randomness.
-135-
only SEPTA exhibited better relative performance on the revenue/expense
ratio. It is also interesting to note that SEPTA scored worse on tne
rev./ven. hr. measure, suggesting that improvement of tne rev./exp. ratio
was attained by recuciCng the most costly services. This may or may not
support the state's objectives.
Another way tc improve the rev./exp. ratio is to increase fares.
Of the ten operators which performed better than tne peer group on the
rev./exp. ratio, nine increased their fares which may also be inconsis-
tent with tne state's objectives. Fare increases may prevent some
people from using transit who have no other means of transportation.
However, since one of the bonuses is depenaent upon maintaining a
minimum rev./exp. ratio, the operators may be inclined to raise fares
since it appears tnat a state goal is to prevent extraordinary declines
in fareDox recovery.
The exp./ven. hr. measure may be improved by eliminating or
reducing the most expensive services. For example, by reducing peak
period frequencies the number of split shifts and trippers required will
be reduced. Since these drivers are more expensive per hour ot service,
the reduction in expenses will be greater than the reduction in vehicle
hours. However, reducing tne peak period frequencies may lead to poor
service (long waiting times and crowded vehicles). The operator may
also reduce exp./veh. hr. by using part-time drivers or better scheduling
of existing drivers without reducing frequencies. As mentioned previously,
only three o- the thirteen Pennsylvania operators (SEPTA, COLTS, ana
LCTA) reduced their vehicle hours, Only one of tnese performed better
on the expense/vehicle hour measure,
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The Wilcoxon Test shows that the change of the revenue/expense
was better for the Pennslyvania operators than their peer group counter-
parts and that the better performance is not due to randomness. However,
the better relative performance of the Pennsylvania operators may simply
be due to the continuation of an established trend. The information
from the previous year (prior to the program) helps to understand the
program impacts by providing data about the relative performance of the
Pennsylvania operators prior to the program.
In order to determine if the better relative performance of the
Pennsylvania operators on the revenue/expense measure is the continu-
ation of a trend, the Wilcoxon test was also performed on the pre-
program data. The Wilcoxon Test resulted in acceptance of the null
hypothesis and therefore, with 95% probability, the better relative
performance of some of the operators is simply due to randomness. Thus,
it is even more likely that improvement of the revenue/expense measure
from Year 2 to Year 3 is a program result.
The second perspective taken in interpreting the results is to
examine all four measures for each system to see if the program had a
greater impact on individual operators. In Tables 4.7 and 4.8 we see
that two of the Pennsylvania systems (AMTRAN and WMSPT) for which data
for all four measures is reliable show greater performance improvement
than their peer group counterparts between Year 2 and Year 3 on all four
measures. In the previous year these operators showed greater improve-
ment for up to two measures. This suggests that the program may have
had a positive impact across the board on these operators. None of
these systems decreased their vehicle hours, showing that the improvement
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of the measures is not the result of service cutbacks. However, both
systems raised their fares which is contrary to the legislative goals
yet consistent with the state's minimum recovery ratio.
Four of the Pennsylvania systems (PAT, BARTA, LANTA, and CAT) show
more improvement on three of the measures during the second year. Both
PAT and BARTA showed better improvements in performance between the
second two years on the revenue/expense, expense/vehicle hour, and
revenue/vehicle hour measures. However, PAT showed better performance
of these measures in the previous year and BARTA showed better performance
on two of the measures (revenue/expense and expense/vehicle hour) in the
previous year. Thus we cannot tell if the better relative performance
is the continuation of a trend or if it is a program effect.
Both PAT and BARTA increased their vehicle hours, showing that
expenses were not reduced by service cutbacks. Again, however, both
systems raised their fares. The fare increases may have reduced the
number of people using transit as suggested by the decrease in passen-
gers for this year. LANTA performed better on the revenue/expense,
revenue/vehicle hour and passenger/vehicle hour measures. However, in
the year prior to the program LANTA also performed better on the revenue/
vehicle hour and passenger/vehicle hour terms. Thus, the program may
not have been the cause of the better performance of these measures.
CAT performed better on the revenue/expense, revenue/vehicle hour,
and expense/vehicle hour measures for the second year while in the
previous year it scored better only on the expense/vehicle hour measure.
This may suggest a positive program effect.
Three systems exhibited better relative performance of two of the
-138-
four measures--CCTA, RRTA, and SEPTA. CCTA exhibited better relative
performance on the revenue/expense and revenue/vehicle hour terms than
its peer group mean. In the previous year, none of the measures showed
better improvement. Therefore, the program may have led to improvement
in increasing revenues and/or controlling expenses. The control over
expenses may have been attained by reducing service since the number
of vehicle hours decreased. RRTA showed better relative performance of
the revenue/expense and revenue/vehicle hour terms and SEPTA showed
better relative performance in the revenue/expense and expense/vehicle
hour measures. In the previous year, however, RRTA showed greater
improvement of the revenu/vehicle hour and revenue/expense measures.
Thus, the program may not have beeh the cause of the better performance
of these measures. SEPTA decreased its vehicle hours, which may account
for some of the changes in performance (lower expense/vehicle hour and
passengers/vehicle hour). Both systems also increased their fares.
EMTA only showed better relative performance of one measure:
expense/vehicle hour. In the previous year, it performed relatively
better on the revenue/expense and revenue/vehicle hour measures.
Improvement of the expense/vehicle hour measure did not result from
service cutbacks, as the number of vehicle hours increased since
implementation of the program. Fares remained stable and thus cannot
explain the lack of improvement of the other measures.
COLTS and LCTA showed greater improvement of only the pasengers/
vehicle hour measure, and both of these systems showed greater improve-
ment of this measure for the year prior to the program. LCTA also
performed better on the revenue/vehicle hour measure during the pre-
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program year. The number of vehicle hours decreased between the second
and third years, which may represent an unsuccessful attempt to improve
the measures.
The peer group analysis shows that the performance of the Pennsyl-
vania operators on the revenue/expense measure improved more relative
to their peer group means and that the number of Pennsylvania operators
doing better than the peer group mean increased in the first post-
program year. Table 4.9 shows that the percentage of the Pennsylvania
operators performing better than the mean in the post-program year for
three measures is higher than for the pre-program year. This suggests
that the program may have led to performance improvements of these
measures.
As shown in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 more of the Pennsylvania operators
are scoring better on a greater number of indicators than before the
program. This also suggests that the program may have had an effect on
performance. However, no conclusions can be drawn about whether any of
the improvements promote the state's goals since the exact nature of
the changes made to improve performance are unknown.
4.5 Bonus Awards
The bonus awards are intended to provide incentives forithe oper-
ators to improve performance and in order for operators to respond they
must see the rewards as significant. The amount of effort an operator
devotes to improving performance may depend upon the size of the reward.
The bonus rewards received by some of the Pennsylvania systems are
-140-
TABLE 4.9 PERCENT OF PA OPERATORS
PERFORMED BETTER RELATIVE TO PEER GROUP
Revenue/Exp Exp/Veh Hr Rev/Veh Hr Pass/Veh Hr
% of PA
systems
performing 42% 42% 42% 50%
better
Year 1-2
% of PA
systems
performing 75% 58% 67% 50%
better
Year 2-3
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TABLE 4.10 NUMBER OF MEASURES BETTER THAN THE PEER GROUP
YR. 1-2 # Better YR. 2-3
1
2
1
3
1
3
2
3
4
4
2
3
These are only for systems for which data on all four measures was reliable.
SYSTEM
EMTA
CCTA
COLTS
BARTA
L CTA
LANTA
RRTA.
CAT
AMTRAN
WMSPT
SEPTA'
PAT-
# Better
3
0
1
2
2
2
3
1
2
1
0
3
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TABLE 4.11 SUMMARY OF RELATIVE PERFORMANCE
# of better
measures
4
3
2
1
0
# of Systems
Year 1-2 Year 2-3
0
3
4
3
2
2
4
3
3
0
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shown in Table 4.12 for fiscal years 1980/81 through 1983/84. These
awards seem large enough to encourage at least the larger operators
to improve performance of the specified measures. However, since the
post-program data is so limited, it is difficult to draw any conclusions
about the effects of the bonus awards.
Also, because the legislation requires that bonus awards be
based on actual performance the bonus awards are not received until
two years after the data is collected; there is a two year lag between
the performance and the awards. Therefore, the bonus awards presented
in Table 4.12 were based on pre-program performance and the operators
may not have linked their actions to improve performance with the
amount of assistance received. -
4.6 Summary
The time-series analysis of the Pennsylvania sytems showed that
the year to year changes of the revenue/expense and revenue/vehicle hour
measures improved after implementation of the performance-based operating
assistance allocation program. The peer group comparison also showed
that with 95% confidence the change of the revenue/expense ratio of
the Pennsylvania operators was better relative to operators nation-
wide for the first post-program year. Thus, improvement of the revenue/
expense ratio is not a nationwide t-.end and is most likely a result of
the program. The results of the peer group analysis are not quite as
strong for revenue/vehicle hour. Although 67% of the Pennsylvania
operators improved this measure relative to their respective peers,
*
These are the actual grants Adetermined by PennDOT. The number of
bonuses awarded may not be consistent with bonuses determined using
the data provided in this thesis because there are unexplained in-
consistencies in the data sets.
-144-
TABLE 4.12 PERFORMANCE BONUS AWARDS
FY 1980-81
No. of
SYSTEM Bonuses Amount
Fy 1981-82
Base No. of
Grant Bonuses
Base
Amount Grant
$ 3,335,346
6,385,369
7,070
23,332
53,390
23,475
22,313
15,057
50,551
27,184
21,679
11,880
6,942
26,694,780
67,253,168
56,585
245,742
427,312
187,885
247,935
250,963
404,590
286,312
173,510
125,125
106,888
4
3
3
$ 3,957,430
8,294,042
16,359
48,899
67,039
29,987
27,691
21,679
58,776
33,446
22,871
14,335
9,643
31,673,692
87,356,047
172,299
752,909
706,081
315,835
426,365
722,669
619,051
514,976
240,886
220,719
321,449
Source: The History and Evolution of the Pennsylvania
Grant Methodology, Dockendorf , 1982.
4
3
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
CCTA
COLTS
EMTA
LANTA
LCTA
RRTA
WMSPT
YATA
Formul a
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TABLE 4.12 cont'd
FY 1982-83
No of
SYSTEM Bonuses Amount
2,107,976
6,244,384
15,752
49,750
42,148
11,210
25,480
64,113
39,862
38,337
18,000
37,848
21,651
FY 1983-84
Base No of
Grant Bonuses
35,134,681
104,078,272
165,897
829,209
702,485
- 373,699
424,695
712,406
664,393
403,771
300,015
398,633
240,593
Base
Amount Grant
Undetermined
3
2
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
rA'RTA
CAT
CCTA
COLTS
EMTA
L.'NTA
CCTA
RRTA
WMSPT
YATA p
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we can state with only 85% confidence that +his result was not random.
However, given the small amount of data available and the quality of
this data, it is reasonable to state with results at this level that
performance of the Pennsylvania operators on this measure was better
relative to operators nationwide and that, given the results of the
time-series analysis, the program may have had a positive impact on
the performance of this measure.
The peer group comparison shows that a greater percentage of the
Pennsylvania operators performed better relative to systems nation-
wide on the revenue/expense, revenue/vehicle hour, and expense/vehicle
hour measures (after implementation of the program). However, per-
formance of the passenger/vehicle -hour measure did not improve relative
to the peer group, and improvement of the expense/vehicle hour measure
for some systems may have been due to randomness.
The number of Pennsylvania operators scoring greater improvements
than the peer group mean also increased between the two pre-program
years and the pre- to post- program years. This also supports the
conclusion that the program has affected performance of the Pennsyl-
vania operators.
The analysis does not provide any concrete conclusions about the
effectiveness of the program in improving performance of the expense/
vehicle hour and passenger/vehicle hour measures. However, the lack of
conclusive evidence does not mean that the program is unable to improve
the performance of these measures. The lack of conclusive evidence may
be explained by any of the following:
(1) The program has not caused the operators to try to improve
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performance of these measures. The operators may have
concentrated on improving revenues since they can earn two
bonus awards by improving revenues and ignored the passenger/
vehicle hourand expense/vehicle hour measures.
(2) The program has caused operators to try to improve these
measures but (a) attempts to improve these measures have been
fruitless or (b) the performance improvements have been too
small to detect in the analysis.
(3) The effects of the program on these measures are delayed and
will show up in later years. Improvement of the revenue/
expense and revenue/vehicle hour measures can be attained by
raising fares. However, actions taken to improve both the
expense/vehicl'e hour and passengers/vehicle hour measures may
not display immediate results or may take longer to implement.
For example, since labor costs represent such a large per-
centage of operating costs, negotiations with the labor unions
may be needed to improve expenses. However, changes can
only be made for the next contract and the operator must
abide by the current contract until its term ends.
Thus, the performance-based allocation may lead to improved performance
of the expense/vehicl hour aAd passenger vehicle hour measures in the
long run.
The successfulness of Pennsylvania's program in improving perfor-
mance shows that the performance-based approach merits consideration as
a more efficient and effective procedure to allocate statetransit opera-
ting assistance. Chapter Five discusses the potential of this approach,
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identifies potential implementation problems, and outlines a general
framework for development and administration of such a program.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4
"Pennsylvania Urban Mass Transportation Law," Act 101, Article II,
Section 201, pp. 2-3.
Ibid, Section 203, p. 3.
Vuchic, V. R. et. al., Transit Operating Manual, 1978, pp. 2-3.
"Purchase of Service Program Definitions," PennDOT.
1
2
3
4
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CHAPTER 5
PERFORMANCE-BASED OPERATING SUBSIDY ALLOCATION PROGRAMS--
THEIR POTENTIAL AND A GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK
5.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters of this thesis have indicated that the
performance-based approach to allocating state transit operating assis-
tance can lead to more efficient and effective service provision. The
review of alternative approaches to allocating state operating assistance
in Chapter Two showed that the performance-based approach has the
following advantages:
(1) It provides accountability to the state for the use of its
funds. By requiring periodic performance reports, a per-
formance-based program provides the means for the state to
keep track of the operator's service provision.
(2) It can be designed to promote state objectives. If the funds
are allocated on the basis of performance measures which
represent a translation of the state's objectives, an
incentive is provided to the operators to achieve the state's
goals.
(3) It provides for consistent grant determination both between
systems and between years and hence, delivers a clear message
to the operators about how to increase their grants.
(4) Funding is predictable and the operator can influence the
amount of funds received, given some contol over the system's
performance.
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The performance-based approach, thus, improves many of the current
approaches to allocating operating assistance. However, the success
of this approach is largely dependent upon how it is designed and
administered.
Chapter Three presented the performance-based allocation programs
which have been developed for five different states. Although all five
statesallocate funds on the basis of performance evaluation, the indi-
vidual programs differ in many respects and are administered in different
manners. Each program represents an alternative method to deal with the
difficulties of developing a performance-based operating assistance
allocation program. Programs which allocate funds directly on the
basis of performance have the grea-test potential to influence performance
since the operators ability to provide service is at stake. Thus, the
Pennsylvania program, which rewards operators for improvement of
specific measures, was selected for analysis to determine if the program
led to improvements of the performance measures.
Analysis of the Pennsylvania program showed that performance of
the systems in Pennsylvania may have improved after the program went
into effect. The potential of performance-based allocation programs
was suggested by improvement of two of the measures for operators in
Pennsylvania and the number of operators performing better on a
greater number of measures. Thus, development of such programs should
continue.
A performance-based approach to allocating transit assistance may
be preferable, given the current concerns about the use of limited
public funds. This approach can be effectively used to improve the
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performance of transit systems. The potential of this approach to
improve performance results from several factors:
(1) General recognition of the need to improve service. By
specifically pinpointing measures of performance, the perform-
ance-based approach inherently tells operators where to concen-
trate their efforts.
(2) 'Peer pressure. When using the performance-based approach, the
resluts of the performance evaluation are published, and it
becomes easier to compare the performance of operators (although
comparisons between operators may not be appropriate). Thus,
a sense of competition is built between the systems.
(3) Funding pressure. The operators will be motivated to improve
performance in order to obtain the maximum available funds.
This chapter examines the problems encountered in developing and
implementing performance-based assistance allocation programs and
suggests ways to resolve some of these problems so that greater
improvements of performance may be attained. The first part of the
chapter discusses potential problems (identified in Chapters Three and
Four) in developing and implementing performance-based allocation
programs and possible resolutions. The second section suggests a
general framework for development of such programs.
5.2 Potential Implementation Problems
Perhaps the most fundamental reason why the performance-based
approach to allocating state operating assistance to transit is not
frequently employed is the difficulty in developing and implementing
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a program which is acceptable to both the state and the transit operators.
The basic obstacle to such programs is the difficulty in developing a
performance evaluation. The problems encountered in developing performance
evaluations and their inappropriate uses have led to opposition from many
transit operators to any attempt at evaluating performance. Several
major problems of conducting an effective performance evaluation were
uncovered in the review of performance-based allocation programs and
the analysis of Pennsylvania's program:
(1) the lack of clear, nonconflicting goals for transit
(2) the inadequacy of many performance measures and the difficulty
of defining standards
(3) the lack of reliable data
(4) the complexity and cost of administering such a program
This section discusses these problems and offers some possible solutions.
5.2.1 Identification of Goals
The essential first step of any evaluation is to identify the
goals and objectives of the activity to which is to be evaluated.
In transit, this is not an easy task since there are many different
perspectives (federal, state, local, operator, user) from which transit
goals may be defined. The absence of universal transit goals results
in two types of conflict:
(1) Conflict between goals determined by different interests.
(2) Conflict within the set of goals defined by a single interest.
When using the results of a transit service evaluation to determine the
*
Goals are idealized end states which are represented by generalized
statements that broadly relate the physical environment to values.
Objectives are statements which conform to attainment of a goal which
are measurable.
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allocation of state operating assistance, two categories of state-
level goals are of primary concern:
(1) the goals of providing transit service
(2) the goals of providing transit assistance
These are the goals which are of primary concern in a performance-
based allocation program, although other interests must not be ignored.
Even though these two state goals are the major focus of a performance-
based assistance allocation program, the issue of defining goals is
quite complicated. Although both types of goals can generally be
found in the state's transit legislation, the goals of providing
assistance may vary across states. As was shown in the Pennsylvania
program, the performance-based program may not address all of the
state's goals. Some of the goals are too broad to be incorporated in
a single performance statistic. Also, it may not be appropriate to
allocate assistance on. th basis of attainment of some goals.
As in Pennsylvania, the goals of providing transit service are
usually broad goals concerning improvement of transportation flows,
revitalization of urban areas, energy conservation, improvement of
accessibility, and provision of mobility to the transportation dis-
advantaged. However, it is not clear how to evaluate systems with
respect to these goals since states seldom define clear, operational
objectives for transit services. It is difficult to translate such
broad goals into performance measures since their attainment is
dependent on many factors (many of which are outside of the operator's
control) in addition to the services provided. Thus, in order to
evaluate transit performance in terms of the state's goals for transit
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service, objectives for transit performance which support attainment
of these goals must be defined.
Interpretation of the state's transit goals may be facilitated
by examining the state's goals and objectives for providing transit
assistance which tend to be a little more specific. Although these
goals may vary from state to state, the goals of providing transit
assistance are usually related to maintaining existing services or
ensuring that a minimum level of service is offered in support of the
belief that transit promotes broad societal goals. Some states
(especially those which allocate funds on the basis of performance)
also assert that the operating assistance be administered with the goals
of improving transit service and facilitating control over transit
costs (efficiency and effectiveness). -
Although it is sometimes easier to define measures of performance
in relation the state's goals for funding transit, these measures
must also promote the state's goals for transit. Sometimes better
performance of a measure may show positive progress toward attainment
of one goal and may also be detrimental to overall transit goals.
For example, in Pennsylvania the effectiveness of transit is par-
tially evaluated according to passengers/vehicle hour without attention
to the characteristics of the passengers and a state goal is to pro-
vide mobility to the transportation disadvantaged. If the operator
improves performance of the passengers/vehicle hour measure by
eliminating the lowest ridership routes, and a high proportion of
transportation disadvantaged live along these routes, iimprovement of the
measure is contrary to one of the state's goals.
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The lack of clear, nonconflicting goals and objectives complicates
the problem of defining performance measures. The states which have
chosen to use the perfomance-based approach to allocating transit
assistance,however, usually state that their goals are to ensure that
transit services are provided efficiently and effectively. The
measures often selected to evaluate the performance of transit systems
may be separated into three general categories -- cost efficiency,
cost effectiveness, and service effectiveness. Although these measures
may not directly represent attainment of the state's goals, they sup-
port the long term viability of transit. The selection of performance
measures is discussed in the following section, along with selection of
the evaluation design and standards since these factors are inex-
tricably linked.
5.2.2 Selection of Performance Measures
If a state wants to promote specific goals through the use of a
performance-based assistance allocation program, it is essential that
the measures selected truly represent the specified goals. Many of
the aggregate measures which have been used do not necessarily show
achievement of the state's goals. The analysis of performance must
go beyond these aggregate measures to determine if the program is
successful in promoting the state's goals.
The four indicators used by the Pennsylvania program to evaluate
performance and allocate bonus funds'(operating revenue/operating
expense; revenue passengers/vehicle hour; operating revenue/vehicle
hour; and operating expense/vehicle hour) may be improved with detri-
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mental effects on transit service and/or by actions contrary to the
state's goals. For example, the operator may improve the revenue
passengers/vehicle hour term by reducing services and causing crowding
on many vehicles or by eliminating low ridership routes. The revenue/
expense and revenue/vehicle hour terms may be improved by raising fares,
which is contrary to a specific state goal. Thus, it is essential to
look not only at the changes of the aggregate measures of performance,
but also at the service changes which cause the measure to change.
As was mentioned previously, performance measures from three
categories are commonly used to evaluate performance;
(1) Efficiency is concerned with the cost of alternative methods
of providing transit service. It is the capacity of a transit
operator to produce service in proportion to the effort
expended; the ratio of outputs to inputs. An evaluationof
efficiency should explore the question: "Can the same end
result be achieved in a different manner at less cost?"
(2) Effectiveness is concerned with the productivity of an effort,
ie. how much is accomplished relative to the immediate goals.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of a transit
system one must clearly specify the goals of providing transit.
(3) Cost effectiveness is, in a sense, an efficiency measure since
it measures the cost of producing each unit of consumed ser-
vice. The difference between efficiency and cost effective-
ness is the output unit; in the category of efficiency
measures the output unit is produced service while in the
cost effectiveness category the output is consumed service.
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The operator has a greater amount of control over efficiency,
and cost effectiveness is partly determined by the operating
environment.
Most of the performance indicators which have been developed can
be classified into sub-categories of the three categories discussed
above. However, the validity of some of the measures used is
questionable. The problem begins in defining measures of inputs,
outputs, and effectiveness.
The difficulty in defining the inputs is a matter of what inputs
to consider. For example, is it appropriate to include total costs?
net cost (cost-revenue)? operating costs? total employee costs? or
driver costs? Similarly, how do you define output? Is it vehicle
hours? vehicle miles? capacity hours/miles? Effectiveness has been
defined by total passengers, revenue passengers, passenger miles --
which is most appropriate? Are any of these? Some of the measures
used are discussed below, in Section 5.2.2.2. However, the various
evaluation designs are discussed first, since the appropriateness of
a measure often depends on the design of the evaluation.
5.2.2.1 Evaluation Design
The appropriateness of specific indicators depends on the design
of the evaluation. The design of th performance evaluation can
influence its results since the design defines how standards will be
set. Some indicators which are inappropriate for use in comparisons
between systems due to differences in the operating environments may
be appropriate when evaluating a system relative to its own previous
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performance. This section discusses the various evaluation designs
employed to evaluate transit performance.
A. Cross-Sectional
Some of the earlier attempts to evaluate the performance of transit
systems involved cross-sectional analyses. The cross-sectional analysis,
since it compares systems with one another, inherently defines the per-
formance of "comparable" systems as the' standard against which to evalu-
ate performance. These comparisons are often naive, however, because
they ignore differences between systems an operating environments. A
cross-sectional analysis should only be used to compare the performance
of similar systems which operate in similar environments. Thus, all fac-
tors external to each system's operations are controlled and any differences
in performance may be attributed to differences in internal operations.
However, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to identify systems for
which all factors that affect performance are identical and therefore
unwise to draw conclusions from a cross-sectional analysis.
Many of the performance measures which have been developed for
transit are improperly used in this form of evaluation since they can-
not account for differences between systems. In fact, many measures are
inherently biased against certain types of systems as discussed in Section
5.2.2.2. Even if similar systems are used, it is difficult to control
the environments in which they operate.
B. Peer Group
In recognition of the many differences between systems which may
affect "performance", most researchers have realized the shortcomings of
a cross-sectional analysis. The need for evaluationled to alternative
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evaluation designs, one of which is the peer group design.
The peer group design attempts to control for differences between
systems. A "peer group" of operators is selected which is similar to the
operator being evaluated so that the number of differences between the
systems (which may affect 'performance) is reduced. Thus, the peer group
design allows, to some extent, comparisons between systems. However, many
operators are adverse to any comparisons between systems even if the
systems are similar.
C. Time-Series
The time=series design avoids the problems of comparing systems by
evaluating each system's performance relative to its previous performance.
Thus, the standard is defined as the system's previous performance and
the system is evaluated on the basis of its deviation from this standard.
This design is employed in the Pennsylvania program where the standards
are defined.as minimum improvement of the measure or maximum decline of
the measure.
Although the time-series design eliminates the problems of comparing
different systems, it introduces problems of defining standards. When
using a time-series analysis, standards may be set in several manners:
(1) any improvement of the measure from the previous year
(2) A pre-defined minimum level of improvement of the measure from
the previous year
(a) based on previous trend
(b) based on "expected" performance, determined as a reasonable
level of improvement
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The time-series evaluation which only rewards operators for improve-
ment of the measures (as in Pennsylvania) is a limited method of conducting
the performance-based approach. The problem arises once an operator attains
the maximum score of the measure and performance can no longer be improved;
once this level is attained, the operator is penalized because he is no
longer eligible to receive the performance bonus awards. Thus, this type
of program indirectly provides an incentive not to attain the true maximum
potential scores of the measures and, if this potentiail is ever reached, no
incentive to maintain this level exists. An operator can increase his
funding in the long run by reporting lower scores on the measures to allow
room for improvement. The only way to resolve this issue is to identify
the maximum potential scores for each measure for each system and to re-
ward systems which maintain this level. Determination of this level is
an extremely complicated task and beyond the scope of this thesis.
Another weakness of a time-series evaluation is its inability to
account for changes in factors external to the program which may affect
performance. These changes may result in improved performance or may
limit performance, and their effects may be indistinguishable from program
effects. Thus, some control for external factors must be considered.
D. Pooled Time-Series Cross-Sectional
The time-series and cross-sectional evaluations can be combined to
form a pooled time-series cross-sectional evaluation which makes use of
the information available from both the time-series and cross-sectional
data. By combining both data sets and both types of evaluation, this
method encompasses all of the benefits previously mentioned concerning
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each method and eliminates most of the problems. The systems are generally
evaluated relative to their own performance, but the performance of other
operators is used to identify the presence of any trends or factors
external to the program which may cause changes in performance. The
problems with this approach are the large amount of data required and the
complexity of administration.
5.2.2.2 Measures of Performance
The use of aggregate measures to evaluate performance is quite common
in the transit industry. This section discusses some of the more common
measures and suggests service changes that should be monitored along with
the measure to determine if the changes of the measure result from bene-
ficjal service changes. As was mentioned previously, many of the indi-
cators which are currently used weakly define measures of inputs, outputs,
and effectiveness.
Some performance indicators include vehicle hours as an output measure.
The reason cited for the use of this measure over vehicle miles is that
vehicle miles is biased against systems which operate in congested urban
areas. However, vehicle hours are not a measure of service; a passenger
does not value an hour spent in a stationary vehicle. Ideally, we would
want to measure passenger trips or passenger miles as the output of the
system, however, since it is often very costly to obtain this data we
often must compromise with measures such as vehicle miles.
Generally, it is difficult to obtain a good indicator of the output
of a transit system becuase transit service is, in a sense, a perishable
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commodity. In most industries, we can measure the product in actual
physical units. Since transit is a service which only becomes a product
once it is consumed, we must distinguish between effort and actual service.
It may be easier for operators in urban areas to serve more trips per
dollar of input since demand is concentrated. This does not mean, how-
evr, that the operator who has greater costs per unit of service is
performing poorly. It may be that demand is less concentrated in his
service area, but that he serves a high proportion of elderly and han-
dicapped passengers.
Many of the indicators which measure "coverage" encourage increases
in route miles or vehicle hours. This may not be desirable if it results
in eicess service.
Indicators which measure the ratio of peak vehicles, vehicle hours,
or vehicle miles to different types of personnel (eg. maintenance employees,
supervisory employees, etc.) are based on the premise that it is better
to have a smaller ratio of employees to vehicles. This may not be true
below certain levels of employment, especially not for maintenance emp-
loyees. If the intent of such measures is to get at the number of
operating personnel per vehicle, especially drivers, to encourage better
scheduling, one must take into consideration different work rules.
Many vehicle utilization indicators which measure vehicle miles or
vehicle hours per vehicle have been suggested. These measures are more
appropriate for internal management than state-level evaluation.
Including these measures in an evaluation communicates to operators that
running their vehicles more is better (or at least something they will be
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rewarded for). This may be undesirable if operators run empty vehicles
for the sake of scoring higher on the indicator. This measure will
probably be lower for systems which schedule vehicles to meet demand.
Likewise, indicators which compare the number of revenue vehicle miles or
hours to vehicle miles or hours may penalize systems which deadhead their
vehicles in the light-flow direction to decrease the number of vehicles
required and thus operate morcefficiently.
Some researchers have asserted that revenue can be used in indicators
to measure the effectiveness of service. The use of revenues seems
inconsistent with the federal requirement for reduced fares for elderly
or handicapped passengers. This is especially true if we assume that
a goal of transit is to provide mobility to the transportation disad-
vantaged. The use of revenues for determining "effectiveness" implies
that reduced fare passengers are not as "valuable" as full fare passengers.
Some researchers assert that cost recovery is an important measure
to consider because it encourages systems to maximize revenues. Cost
recovery measures are often used in state evaluations, since the state is
trying to encourage self-sufficiency ( or minimization of their support).
Many indicators of service utilization have been developed. Most
of these indicators have been appropriately classified as measures of
srevice effectiveness. They include measures of passengers/revenue
vehicle mile, seat miles utilized/available seat miles, passenger miles/
revenue vehicle miles, etc. These indicators truly indicate the effec-
tiveness of transit service since they show the amount of produced ser-
vice which is utilized.
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Measures of maintenance efficiency and effectiveness and measures of
fuel efficiency are more appropriate for internal use than for a state-
level evaluation, and therefore will not be discussed.
When developing performance indicators for a state operating assis-
tance allocation program, one should-look at the state's goals for pro-
vidling transit assistance and the desired outcome of a performance-based
allocation. The current focus of most evaluations seems to be efficiency
and financial performance; most evaluations ignore the qualityof ser-
vice offered and effectiveness of transit service in meeting the mobility
needs of the population.
In order to determine if change of the performance measure is truly
indicative of progress toward attainment of the state's goals, the evalu-
ator should not only look at the performance of the aggregate indicator
but must also monitor the numerator and denominator of the indicator as
well as any other service variables which may have resulted in the change
of the indicator.
5.2.2.3 Data Reliability
The ability to develop indicators which reflect the intended ob-
jectives is limited by the type and quality of the available data, which,
unfortunately, is quite limiting. However, if such a program is to be
used in allocating assistance, it is essential that the dataused is
accurate. If an operator submits data which looks peculiar, the state
should investigate the validity of the data. If the issue cannot be
resolved, the data should be discarded.
The data used in Pennsylvania contained some questionable values
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(some were obviously erroneous), however, PennDOT used the dataanyway and
may have misallocated resources. A major problem encountered in the Penn-
DOT data is the consistency of the datafrom year to year. Since two years'
data are submitted annually, each year is submitted twice. However, the
data for the same year differed between the two submissions. No explanations
were offered for the data changes, and the data were accepted and used to
determine grants. Thus, erroneous data may have resulted in granting
bonuses to operators whose performance has not really improved.
5.2.2.4 Administration
Many of the problems discussed above can be avoided if the program is
administered well. The state must clearly communicate its goals and ob-
jectives to the operators so that they have a good sense of the state's
expectations. By designating specific indicators, the state sends a
message to the operators that these factors are of major concer. The
standards set by the state inform the operators of the state's expectations,
but do not tell the operators how to attain these standards. The state
could provide technical assistance to the operators so that the approp-
riate changes are made to improve performance.
In order for a performance-based allocation program to be valid and
effective, the state must monitor the data submitted by the operators
to ensure its validity. The differences in data submitted by the oper-
ators in Pennsylvania from year to year are serious problems, which should
not be ignored. The state must assign the task of validating data and
ensuring consistency from year to year before implementing the program.
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If any type of peer group or cross-sectional evaluation design is
used, the state must also ensure uniform data definitions and similar
accuracy of the data between operators. The state may prescribe data
collection techniques to ensure consistency of the data across operators.
The state must also monitor the service changes which cause changes of
the measures to ensure that the steps taken to improve performance are
consistent with the state's goals. Although the time and cost involved
in administering a performance-based allocation program well is high
(for data collection and validation and for monitoring the operators), the
potential improvements of performance and long run savings make it well
worth the effort.
5.3 General Implementation Framework
Even though the Pennsylvania program had many of the above problems,
the analysis suggested that the program resulted in improvements of per-
formance. Thus, the full potential of performance-based programs may
be realized only after these problems are resolved. This section outlines
a general framework for developing and implementing a performance-based
allocation program.
5.3.1 Participation
The acceptance and successof a performance-based allocation program
are determined in the initial development stages. All transit concerns
should be included in the initial development of the program to ensure
full representation of the different perspectives and concerns and en-
courage cooperation once the program is implemented. Early participation
of all transit interests helps to provide a full understanding of the in-
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tents of the program and the manner in which the program is conducted. By
encouraging all interests to participate in development of the program,
thelikelihood of resolving conflicts of interest before implementation
of the program may be increased. Full participation is also essential
throughout development and implementation of the program to pinpoint
problems and recommend improvements upon the program.
5.3.2 Selection of Indicators and Evaluation Design
The choice of indicator(s) determines the effects of the program.
Thus, before selecting the indicator(s), the objective(s) of the program
should be clearly defined (ie. to reduce expenses, increase ridership,
increase revenues, etc.). The objective(s) of the program must be con-
sistent with the state's goals. Once objectives are defined, they must
be operationalized to measures which indicate progress toward their attain-
ment.
When selecting indicators, it is essential that the implications
of any actions taken to improve performance of the measure are considered.
Although some indicators may appear to represent attainment of the state's
goalsthey may actually stimulate actions which are contrary to the
state's goals.
Many factors in addition to the objectives of the program must be
considered when selecting performance measures. First, one must con-
sider the design of evaluation befrore selecting measures. As was dis-
cussed in previous sections, many measures are inappropriately used in
cross-sectional evaluations and some (eg. those which include expenses
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may be dependent upon labor contracts) may take longer to change and thus
changes will not be detected in annual comparisons with the previous year.
Other factors which must be considered in selecting indicators are
availability, reliability and cost of collecting data. Even though
Pennsylvania had the advantage of a relatively mature data collection
program, there were still many quirks in the data used to determine
bonus awards. Inconsistencies of the data made it difficult to determine
the true changes of performance from year to year. When the data are
unreliable, it is unclear whether the perfomance bonuses are justified.
Thus, in order to ensure a legitimate performance-based program, the
state must confirm that the data is reliable. One way for the state to
improve data reliabilty is to provide information to the operators
concerning data collection.. -This support may range from merely providing
literature to actually prescribing data collection techniques.
Data collection costs may constrain not only the accuracy of the
data but also the type and quality of indicators selected. The trade-
offs between data collection costs and the quality of data used should be
considered when developing a performance-base allocation program.
If the state chooses a peer group design to evaluate the operators'
performance, the issues concerning the data used become even more com-
plicated. Consistency of data definitions and accuracy are essential.
If the state chooses to include operators outside its jurisdiction in
the peer group, it must consider the availability and quality of data
for those systems. While UMTA Section 15 reports provide data from
systems nationwide, and although uniform data definitions and accuracy
levels are required, some of the data in these reports is clearly
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erroneous. Thus, care should be taken in selecting comparison systems
from these reports. Also, some of the desired data may not be available
from the Section 15 reports. Improvement of the data quality of the
Section 15 reports will facilitate peer group comparisons.
5.3.3 Administration
No matter how well designed a performance-based allocation program
is, such a program does no good unless it is administered properly.
This type of program may be well designed but too complex to be admin-
istered on an annual basis due to budget and staff limitations. Thus,
the program should be kept relatively simple.
The most crucial factor in administering the program is the cal-
culation ot the performance grant. Thus, it is essential that the state
assigns individuals to check the data for consistency from year to year
and to validate the data for each new year. If this task is ignored, the
integrity of the program may be questioned since operators will be able
to supply data which meets the requirements to earn the bonus awards
although their actual performance does not merit the awards.
Another factor to consider is the size of the bonus awards. The
awards must be large enough to provide an incentive to the operators
to improve performance. When compared with the total state grant, the
awards seem to warrent more attention than when compared with the total
budget. When compared with the total budget (Table 5.1), the largest
performance grant received (for four measures) was only 3% of the total
budget.
TABLE 5.1 BONUS AWARDS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL BUDGET
SYSTEM
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
CCTA
COLTS
EMTA
LANTA
LCTA
RRTA
WMSPT
No. of
Bonuses
4
3
4
3
4
4
3
2
4
3
4
3
FY 1980-81
Total
Budget
115,469,272
351,726,173
1,353,097
3,739,240
4,204,168
2,158,576
3,084,015
4,070,240
4,434,200
3,710,898
2,178,000
1,096,587
No. of
Bonuses~ AmountAmount
3,335,346
6,385,369
7,070
-23,332
53,390
23,475
22,313
15,057
50,551
27,184
21,679
11,880
% of
Budget
2.9
1.8
0.5
0.6
1.3
1.1
0.7
0.4
1.1
0.7
1.0
1.1
3,957,4
8,294,0
T6, 3
48,8
67,0
29,9
27,6
21,6
58,7
33,4
22,8
14,3
FY 1981-82
Total
Budget
30 123,375,851-
42 368,179,000
59 1,362,523
99 3.791.815
39 4,569,233
87 2,441,533
91 2,992,680
79 4,087,631
76 4,500,080
46 3,961,540
71 2,306,476
35 1,165,234
% of
Budget
3.2
2.2
1.2
1.3
1.5
1.2
0.7
0.5
1.3
0.8
1.0
1.2
H1
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This small grant is an excellent way to test the program in its
early years to determine if, in fact, the program is well defined and
acheives its intents. After any kinks in the program are worked out, the
size of the performance bonuses may be expanded to provide greater rewards
and hence greater incentive to improve performance. Another way to
increase the incentives provided to improve performance is to gain par-
ticipation from local funding agencies. If the local agencies are not
aware of or supportive of the program, the operators may be less in-
clined to strive for the awards since the locals will make up for the
funds not received in bonuses. However, if the locals also put pressure
on the operators to improve performance, the program can be even more
effective.
Thus, although the analysis of the Pennsylvania program only showed
improvement of two of the measures, the true potential of such programs,
has not been realized. As discussed above, improvements can be made to
increase the effectiveness of the program in improving performance and
to facilitate attainment of the state's goals.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS,-AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
6.1 Summary
The provision of transit operating assistance is an issue of great
concern to both elected officials and to the transit industry throughout
the U.S. Increasing transit deficits are placing an increasing strain on
budgets at all levels of government. Since the federal government is
seeking to reduce the amount of operating assistance it provides,
states and localities are providing an increasing amount of assistance
to transit. However, as the amount of operating assistance appropriated
to transit has increased, there has been an increasing concern about the
use of these funds. Some have contended that at least partof the cause
of -the increasing deficits is inefficiency of operations. Thus, more
accountability in the use of funds is demanded.
The call for accountability has led many states to question the
appropriateness of their approaches to allocating operating assistance.
A review of approaches currently used to allocate operating assistance at
the state level shows that some approaches reinforce poor performance,
some support continuation of negative trends, and some are inequitable.
The performance-based approach has the potential to improve the allocation
of scarce funds and at the same time promote improvements of performance
and hence is of interest to many states. In this thesis, the programs
of five states which use different forms of the performance-based approach
were examined, the differences reflecting funding philosophies as well as
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the difficulties of developing performance-based programs.
The Pennsylvania program, one of the programs reviewed, lent itself
to more detailed analysis. This program provides direct rewards to op-
erators for improvement of specific measures. The first analysis con-
ducted was a time-series analysis which showed that the annual changes
of two of the four measures improved after implementation of the perform-
ance-based operating assistance allocation program. However, since the
time-series analysis did not control for factors external to the program
which may have caused these changes, a second analysis was conducted
based on peer group comparisons. The peer group comparisons, which
controlled for factors external to the program which may have affected per-
formance, supported the conclusions of the time-series analysis. Thus,
we can conclude that the program did, in fact, result in performance
improvements.
The indications of successin the Pennsylvania program suggest that
the performance-based approach deserves more attention particularly
because the full potential of such a program may not have been realized
in Pennsylvania. Some of the potential problem of this approach were
discussed and improvements upon the current form of performance-based
allocation programs were suggested. Of major concern is the quality
of the data used to determine eligibility for performance grants.
Finally, a general framework for implementation of such a program was
suggested.
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6.2 Conclusions of Thesis
The study of performance-based allocation of state transit operating
assistance showed that this type of program has the potential to improve
on current allocation procedures and that it can lead to improvements of
performance. Analysis of the Pennsylvania program showed it was suc-
cessful in improving two of four measures, despite some administrative
problems.
The true potential of performance-based operating assistance
allocation programs will only be realized if the following problems
are resolved:
(1) The program may not be successful if develoned by the state
without input from other transit interests, most importantly
the operators. Early participation of all transit concerns
may increase understanding and cooperation at all levels. By
involving all concerns early in the process, many of the
potential disagreements can be worked out before the program
is implemented.
(2) Clear goals and objectives are essential. In developing a
performance-based allocation program, several sets of goals
must be considered including the state's goals and its goals
for providing assistance and the goals of other transit in-
terests (locality, users, etc.).
(3) The indicators selected must represent operational measures of
the goals and objectives of the program. Consideration must
be given to the types of changes which might be taken to improve
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these measures and their consistency with state goals. The
indicators selected must also be appropriate to the design of
the evaluation. Many measures are not appropriate for compari-
sons between systems and some are not appropriate for annual
review. Use of inappropriate measuresmay lead to inequitable
funding allocation decisions. The selection of indicators is
also constrained by the availability and quality of data.
(4) The evaluation must be well designed since it determines whether
or not operators receive performance awards. The design of
the evaluation also determines how standards will be set (eg.
if a peer group design is selected, the standard is inherently
defined by the performance of the peer systems). The design
of the evaluation is also dependent upon the availability and
quality of data. If reliable data for peer systems are un-
available, obviously a peer group comparison is infeasible.
Likewise, if reliable data from previous years are unavailable,
a time-series analysis is unacceptable. When selecting an
evaluation design, the complexity and cost of administration
must also be considered. An evaluation which uses data of
operators outside the state will naturally require much more
time and effort. Almost any decision related to data will
require trade-offs between cost and quality since there is a
lack of reliable data in the transit industry.
(5) In order to motivate the operators to improve performance, the
reward for improving performance must be substantial enough to
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make the effort worhtwhile. The Pennsylvania grants, although
not very large, seem to have provided at least some incentive.
The smaller grant is an excellent way to test the program, after
which larger bonuses may be employed once all of the kinks in
the program are eliminated.
(6) The most important factor for success of a performance-based
transit operating assistance allocation program is good admin-
istration. Of major concern is the validation of the data and
the grant calculation It is essential that staff are assigned
to validating the data and ensuring consistency in the data from
year to year. Another essential in administration of the program
is information flow between the various participants (especially
between the operator and the state) and communication concerning
problems.
Successfulness of a performance-based allocation program depends on the
quality of the program, the quality of the data, the operators' under-
standing of the program, the incentives provided, and the operators'
ability to improve performance. Most of the above problems are resolvable,
given some hard though and a lot of effort.
In summary, the performance-based approach to allocating transit
operating assistance can lead to more efficient and effective allocation
of state funds. Improvements of performance were attained in the Penn-
sylvania program, in spite of some waknesses of the program. Improvements
of the current performance-based programs can lead to bet.ter results and
consequent improvements of transit performance. It is hoped that more
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states will- investigate the potential of this approach to allocating oper-
ating assistance and improve upon current techniques.
6.3 Further Research
Several issues were identified during the course of this research
which require further research:
(1) There is a clear need for better data if this type of program
is to be fully evaluated and used to full effect. This need
suggests several areas of research.
(a) It is essential to determine what variables are of common
importance to operators for a perfomance-based program.
Determination of data needs may lead to adjustments of
the Section 15 requirements to include new data elements.
(b) The need for reliable data dictates the need for more
research on data collection techniques which increase
accuracy at low cost.
(2) Another area for further research, which is not unrelated to
the need for better data, is the need to monitor service changes
along with changes in the aggregate performance measures. Only
by determining the cause of the change in the performance measures
can we tell-if the program is meeting its objectives. To
monitor service changes requires the collection of more data.
However, the marginal cost of collecting the extra data may
be small relative to the insight it provides to performance
changes and the possible misallocation of funds.
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(3) A study which evaluates other performance-based allocation
programs should be conducted along with a determination of
which form is most effective. In particular, care should be
taken to determine not only which program has the greatest
effect on the measures, but also to determine which program is
most effective in meeting the state's goals in both the short
and long run.
(4) An analysis utilizing pooled time-series cross-sectional data.
This analysis requires specification of a causal model relating
the dependent variable to a vector of explanatory variables.
The empirical analysis essential for this research requires a
larger amount of reliable data than available for this thesis.
(5) A problem which will eventually be encountered in any program
which rewards operators only for improvements of specified
measures is that a level of performance will be attained where
either the marginal cost of improving service is greater than
the benefits of the improvement or performance is at its max-
imum level and improvements are impossible. An interesting
research problem is to determine the "saturation" point for
the operators' performance.
(6) If the state provides technical assistance to the operators
to inform them about techniques to improve performance, the
improvements of the measures may be greater and more consistent
with the state's goals. Thus, a study of the effect of pro-
viding technical assistance along with the program is warranted
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to determine if the cost of providing technical assistance
provides sufficient improvement of results.
(7) A study of the impact of such a program on local funding
sources and inclusion of the locals in the program should
be conducted to determine if greater effects may be attained.
The development of performance-based transit operating assistance
allocation programs is relatively new and it is unclear how much im-
provement in performance can be improved with such programs. This
research has indicated that performance-based allocation programs can
lead improvements of performance and that the full potential of such
programs is yet to be realized. More study of the issues surrounding
performance-based allocation is necessary as well at improvement of the
data used. States will continue to demand accountability for their
expenditures on transit and these demands may increase as the state
portion of transit assistance is increased. These concerns, along with
concerns about transit performance may be addressed by the performance-
based approach to allocating transit operating assistance.
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APPENDIX A
NYSDOT PERFORMANCE MEASURES
SOURCE: NYSDOT
EFFICIENCY
Labor Productivity: Labor-related expenses averaged 80% of public
transit costs in the state for 1978-79. It is critical, then, that
labor resources be productively utilized in supplying services.
Vehicle hours of revenue service/employee hour is the performance
indicator that was found to provide the best comparison of labor
productivity for most local and intercity transit service in New
York State. This measure results in reducing the differences in
performance caused by differing speeds and/or work rules. However,
because of the peaked nature of high speed commuter rail the bus
services, an alternate measure of vehicle miles of revenue service/
employee hour was also recommended. This measure allows for recogni-
tion of the fact that while commuter services may be provided only a
few hours a day, employee work rules may require more paid hours
than service hours, but that this situation should be offset by the
higher average vehicle speeds usually characteristic of such
service.
Vehicle Utilization: Because of the sizeable (usually public) invest-
ment required to purchase transit vehicles, the effective utilization
of such equipment is also of concern. Annual vehicle hours of service/
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revenue vehicle was found to be a primary indicator of utilization.
Annual vehicle miles of service/vehicle also provides a reasonable
indication of vehicle usage and appears to account for legitimate
expencted disparities between local and express/commuter services
that may only be operated a few hours a workday but at generally
higher average speeds.
ECONOMY
Service Cost: Ensuring that each unit of transit service is provided
in an economical manner is a principal objective of transit operators,
users, and funding agencies. Operating Costs/ capacity hour of service
or capacity mile of service are acceptable measures of such costs.
Capacity hour comparisons tend to favor commuter and intercity
services. Used as alternatives or in combination, the two measures can
recognize legitimate differences among modes and service types.
Capacity hour or capacity mile statistics are used in place of the
more standard seat-mile or seat-hour measurement in order to address
the wide variation in vehicle capacities (a 15 passenger bus vs.
the 3000 passenger commuter ferry) due to the service types and
configuration (e.g. buses in New York City are specifically designed
to accommodate fewer seated passengers and more standees than in most
urban areas of the state).
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Self-Sufficiency: One of the key tests of the economy of a public
transit system is the public's willingness to pay for the service --
both in terms of fares and intercity in terms of non-mandated local
government contributions. While the ratio of operating revenue/
operating expenses has long been used to measure the profitability
or financial viability of transit operators, a companion measure
is also needed to assure that reasonable fare levels are being charged
on services that, by their very nature, are not expected to off-set
a sizeable portion of costs via the farebox (e.g., rural and specialized
services). This measure, operating revenue plus excess local assistance/
passenger mile also recognizes the right of local governments to
artificially keep fare levels low by voluntarily providing jincreased
operating assistance. The passenger mile base permits comparisons
among modes and service types of providing a unit-of-service measure
common to all.
EFFECTIVENESS
Usage Levels: Since a principal objective of public transit is to move
people, the success of a system in accomplishing this should be
considered in any measure of performance. Three measures, when used
as a set of alternatives were found to be appropriate: revenue
passengers per capacity hour; revenue passenger miles per capacity
hour; and revenue passenger miles per capacity mile. The first
measure favors those services intended to carry passengers very short
distances, while the second favors longer distance services. The
last factor measures the number of seats and standing spaces that are
-189-
typically filled - the average load factor experienced by a service.
Passenger Unit Cost: The cost and deficit associated with carrying one
passenger a distance of one mile is also a key indicator of how
efficiently resources are being applied. Two measures were found to
be a reasonable indicators of such concerns - operating cost per
revenue passenger mile, and deficit per revenue passenger mile.
While relative costs among services may reflect inappropriate uses of
resources, this situation may be offset by relative differences in
revenue generation; hence, the use of both cost, and cost-less-revenue
(deficit) comparisons are necessary for adequate consideration of
this issue.
Labor/Usage Relationship: Because of the significance of labor-
associated costs, it is desirable to compare the level of labor
input to service usage levels (the principal product generated).
Passengers per employee hour and passenger miles per employee hour
are suggested for use as alternative measures to recognize differences
in vehicle and service types (e.g., local vs. express/intercity).
It is important to note that measures of this type should not be used
to measure 'labor productivity' or 'labor efficiency' as the input
(employee hours) have no direct (and possibly no indirect) control
over the output (passengers, passenger-miles, or other passenger-
related measure). These measures are useful, however, as an indica-
tor of the effectiveness of service planning and management techniques.
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APPENDIX B
Recommended Formula 1:
Step 1: Determine a Service Level Indicator (SLI) for each city.
M. P. AR. AP. AC.
EM. EP. R. P. C.
Where M. = revenue miles in city i
P. = passengers in city i; AP. is the increase in pass
in city i
R. = revenue/mile in city i; AR. is the increase in
revenue/mile in city i
C = cost/passenger in city i; AC is the reduction
in cost/passenger in city i
Step 2: Allocate to each city using share model concept
SLI.
1 ESLI.
1
Where S. = the proportion allocated to city i
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Recommended Formula 2:
Step 1: Categorize systems according to area characteristics.
Set 25% of the available funds aside in a discretionary
account.
Step 2: Allocate funds to system categories.
D.
=
zD.
S
D = ED ; i E j
Where S. =
D. =
D. =
1
amount of subsidy allocated to category j
the net deficit of category j
the net deficit of system i
Step 3: Allocate funds within categories.
R MS. WS ( ) + W i ( ) ] S.
Where S. = amount of subsidy allocated to system i
WR, W = Weights assigned to ridership (WR ) andj 3
vehicle miles (W ) for category j.
R. = ridership of system i
M. = vehicle miles of system i
APPENDIX C PERFORMANCE MEASURES
TABLE
SYSTEM FY 75-76 FY 76-77
PAT 0.50 0.49
SEPTA 0.49 0.43
AMTRAN 0.56 0.47
BARTA 0.59 0.59
CAT 0.65 0.55
CCTA 0.80 0.62
COLTS 0.60 0.59
EMTA 0.63 0.62
LANTA 0.49 0.48
LCTA 0.61 0.58
RRTA 0.57 0.44
WMSPT 0.48 0.40
POTTSTOWN 0.56 0.45
C-1
FY
OPERATING REVENUE/OPERATI
77-78
0.45
0.52
0.39
0.63
0.50
0.58
0.50
0.61
0.46
0.57
0.46
0.35
0.51
NG EXPENSE
FY 78-79 FY 79-80 FY 80-81
0.43 0.46 0.51
0.49 0.48 0.54
0.39 0.38 0.41
0.58 0.53 0.58
0.53 0.55 0.53
0.51 0.55 0.48
0.48 0.39 0.39
0.57 0.53 0.54
0.45 0.45 0.47
0.52 0.49 0.49
0.43 0.47 0.50
0.35 0.32 0.35
0.46 0.43 0.42
FY 81-82
0.49
0.53
0.44
0.61
0.51
0.47
t\..0.40
0.59
0.48
0.54
0.53
0.34
0.47
TABLE C-2 OPERATING REVENUE/VEHICLE HOUR
SYSTEM FY 75-76 FY 76-77 FY 77-78
PAT 12.29 13.09 13.37
SEPTA 16.28 17.01 23.59
AMTRAN 7.96 6.64 6.54
BARTA 9.47 10.76 11.53
CAT 13.16 9.66 10.11
CCTA 12.06 11.61 10.01
COLTS 8.78 9.66 8.83
EMTA 8.40 9.47 10.21
LANTA 7.56 7.91 8.76
LCTA 8.03 8.60 9.64
RRTA 11.93 7.27 7.82
WMSPT 5.70 5.52 5.65
POTTSTOWN 5.15 5.54 6.23
FY 78-79 FY 79-80 FY 80-81
12.78 14.23 18.29
24.75 26.56 33.10
8.42 9.16 11.08
11.35 12.80 15.90
11.26 13.60 14.72
9.53 12.01 11.30
9.18 9.22 11.36
10.83 12.11 13.12
9.45 11.34 13.32
9.69 10.54 12.34
8.34 9.68 11.84
6.16 6.69 7.81
6.45 7.04 8.21
FY 81-82
22.11
36.14
11.77
18.05
15.59
11.47
12.16
15.83
14.24
14.64
13.85
9.82
10.51
TABLE C-3 REVENUE PASSENGERS/VEHICLE HOUR
SYSTEM FY 75-76 FY 76-77 FY 77-78 FY 78-79 FY 79-80 FY 80-81
PAT 34.4 32.4 33.3 30.2 31.7 29.8
SEPTA 42.2 41.7 44.9 48.0 49.3 44.8
AMTRAN 26.6 20.4 23.0 27.5 28.0 28.1
BARTA 31.6 33.1 35.3 41.2 42.9 42,1
CAT 29.6 28.4 30.6 31.6 34.0 32.1
CCTA 24.8 24.7 20.1 20.9 22.2 20.4
COLTS 31.1 31.9 32.5 33.1 35.7 34.1
EMTA 34.3 35.0 38.0 40.4 29.4 26.9
LANTA 23.6 25.4 28.6 30.9 32.8 31.1
LCTA 30.4 30.0 30.8 31.6 34.0 34.6
RRTA 18.8 19.,1 20.7 22.2 23.5 22.7
WMSPT 18.2 18.8 20.9 22.6 25.6 27.3
POTTSTOWN 18.5 19.8 21.9 22.7 25.5 24.2
FY 81-82
29.4
44.6
26.4
39.3
32.7
20.5
32.5
24.0
31.6
34.4
23.-
28.7
25.3
I-
TABLE C-4 OPERATING EXPENSE/VEHICLE HOUR
SYSTEM FY 75-76 FY 76-77 FY 77-78 FY 78-79 FY 79-80 FY 80-81 FY 8i-82
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
CCTA
COLTS
EMTA
LAN TA
LCTA
RRTA
WMSPT
POTTSTOWN
24.78
32.96
14.23
15.95
20.14
15.13
14.58
13.28
15.36
13.13
20.90
11.82
9.21
26.70
39.41
14.17
18.15
17.67
18.75
16.36
15.24
16.59
14.80
16.54,
14.93
12.21
29.64
45.45
16.66
18.32
20.35
17.29
17.49
16.64
18:96
16 79
16.90
16.11
12.32
29.43
50.23
21.69
19.71
21.35
18.66
18.90
19.06
21.22
18. 56
19.3.
17.75
13.89
31.00
54.82
24.03
24.01
24.56
21.94
23.84
22.94
25.08
21.38
20.59
20.77
16.27
35.81
61.75
27.02
27.18
28.04
23.46
29.34
24.50
28.46
25.24
23.58
22.46
19.79
44.96
65.50
26.87
29.52
30.57
24.63
30.17
26.78
30.45
27.23
26.31
28.81
22.58
I
ulI
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APPENDIX D
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS USING STATISTICAL REPORT DATA
This Appendix contains the time-series analysis conducted for the
eight operators using data from the statistical reports for all years.
The data for FY 1975-76 through 1978-79 is the same as that used in
Chapter Four. The data for the remaining three years is listed in
Tables D-1 through D-4.
The results of the analysis are shown in Tables D-5 and D-6. As
shown in these tables, the operators scored consistently better than
expected on the revenue/vehicle hour and revenue/expense measures for
both years. Many of the operators- performed better in Year 7 on the
expense/vehicle hour term also.
The results of the Wilcoxon Test on this data support most of
the results of the data provided in Chapter Four:
(1) The revenue/expense ratio improved for both post-program
years.
(2) The improvements of the passengers/vehicle hour and expense/
vehicle hour measures may be due to randomness.
(3) The revenue/vehicle hour measure was better in the first
post-program year.
However, this test does not support the earlier finding that the revenue/
vehicle hour measure improved in the second post-program year. The test
shows that improvement of this measure for Years 6-7 may have been due to
randomness.
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The inability to reject the null hypothesis, that performance did not
improve, results from the large magnitude of SEPTA's negative difference
from the predicted value, although the majority of operators performed
better than expected on this measure. Thus, although there are differences
in the two data sets, the results of the time-series analysis are similar.
However, this does not mean that the performance bonus grant determination
is the same.
OPERATING REVENUE/oPERATING
SYSTFM FY 79-80 FY 80-81
PAT 0.45 0.49
SEPTA 0.46 0.52
AMTRAN 0.37 0.40
BARTA 0.53 0.54
CAT 0.56 0.54
CCTA 0.55 0.48
COLTS 0.39 0.39
FMTA 0.52 0.51
LANTA 0.45 0.46
LCTA 0.49 0.49
RRTA 0.46 0.49
WMSPT 0.32 0.32
POTTSTOWN 0.43 0.42
E XPEN SE
FY 81-82
0.49
0.53
0.44
0.62
0.52
0.42
0.41
0.57
0.46
0.52
0.52
0.34
0.45
7E 0-2
OPERATN REVENUE/VEHiCLE
SYSTFM FY 79-80 FY 80-81
PAT 14.19 18.21
SEPTA 25.95 35.81
AMTPAN 9.28 11.11
BARTA 12.84 15.38
CAT 13.89 15.05
CCTA 12.08 11.29
COLTS 9.2? 11.17
EMTA 12.11 13.11
LANTA 11,38 13.32
LCTA 10.54 12.33
RRTA 9.68 11.65
WMSPT 6.76 7.85
POTTSTOWN 7.04 8.21
FY 81-82
22.77
36.04
11.74
18.17
16.19
11.38
12.49
15.45
14.20
14.05
13.71
9.67
10.08
H
co
TABLE D-3
REVENUE PASSENGERS/VEHICLE HOUR
SYSTEM FY 79-80 FY 80-81 FY 81-82
PAT 31.8 30.1 33.7
SEPTA 49.7 45.9 45.4
AMTRAN 28.0 28.1 26.4
BARTA 42.9 42.1 39.3
CAT 34.1 32.1 32.7
CCTA 22.3 20.3 20.1
COLTS 35.4 34.3 32.5
EMTA 39.5 37.7 24.0
LANTA 32.9 31.2 31.8
LCTA 34.0 37.6 36.4
RRTA 25.4 24.3 24.8
WMSPT 25.4 27.3 28.6
POTTSTOWN 12.7 9.5 12.6
TABLE D-4
OPERATING EXPENSE/VEGICLE
SYSTEM FY 79-80 FY 80-81
PAT 31.88 37.13
SEPTA 56.74 68.53
AMTRAN 24.97 27.60
BARTA 24.30 28.49
CAT 24.85 28.01
CCTA 21.81 23.46
COLTS 23.84 28.53
EMTA 23.39 25.50
LANTA 25.29 29.20
LCTA 21.38 25.24
RRTA 20.89 23.85
WMSPT 21.03 24.86
POTTSTOWN 16.27 19.79
HOUR
FY 81-82
46.17
68.08
27.35
29.51
30.97
26.89
30.18
27.25
30.89
27.23
26.52
28.81
22.57
I-J
TABLE D-5 CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE
PASS/VEH HF
SYSTEM Predicted
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
COLTS
LANTA
-0.74
2.13
0.99
3.07
1.22
0.98
2.41
POTTSTOWN 1.69
Observed
5-6
-1.7
-3.8
0.1
-0.8
-2.0
-1.1
3.6
-3.2
Observed
6-7
3.6
-0.5
-1.7
-2.8
0.6
-1.8
-1.2
3.1
EXP/VEP HR
Predicted
1.69
5.84
2.9
1.83
1.31
2.11
2,.45
1.58
Observed
5-6
5.25
11.79
2.63
4.19
3.16
4.69
3.91
Observed
6-7
9.04
-0.A5
-0.25
1.02
2.96
1.65
1.69
3.52 2.78
TABLE D-5 cont'd
Rev/Veh Hr
SYSTEM Predicted
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
COLTS
LANTA
POTTSTOWN
0.35
2.71
0.44
0.73
0.31
0.04
0.92
0.47
Observed
5-6
4.02
9.86
1.83
2.54
1.16
1.95
1.94
1.17
Observed
6-7
4.56
0.23
0.63
2.79
1.14
1.32
0.88
1.87
Rev/Exp
Predicted
-0.02
0
-0.05
-0.01
-0.03
-0.05
-0.01
-0.02
Observed
6-7
0
0.01
0.04
0.08
-0.02
0.02
Observed
5-6
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.01
-0.02
0
0.01
-0.01
0
0.03
0
SYSTEM
PAT
SEPTA
AMTRAN
BARTA
CAT
COLTS
LANTA
POTTSTOWN
TABLE D-6
Pass/Veh Hr
5-6 6-7
-+
+
+
RELATIVE CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
Exp/Veh Hr Rev/Veh Hr Rev/Exp
5-6 6-7 5-6 6-7 5-6 6-7
- - + + + +
- + + - + +
+ + + + + +
- + + + + +
- - + + + +
- + 1+ + + +
- + + - + +
- - + + + +
o)
